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A B S T R A C T
We regress socio-economic indicators against ﬁrm level CSR scores using a sample of over 26,000
ﬁrm year observations from 1991 through 2009. We ﬁnd that a ﬁrm's CSR proﬁle is linked to the
socio-economic conditions of the ﬁrm's geographic headquarters (HQ) location. The study docu-
ments that the legal, cultural, economic, and demographic differences across geography signiﬁ-
cantly explain the variation in CSR means between metropolitan statistical areas, states, and
regions. We also ﬁnd that the relation between CSR and ﬁrm performance is conditional on socio-
economic factors, which highlight the endogeneity concerns inherent in CSR studies. Lastly, we
show that ﬁrms that cluster along a CSR continuum experience an increase in ﬁrm value.
1. Introduction
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has been gaining increasing attention from ﬁnance academics. Among several alternative
deﬁnitions available in the literature, CSR has been deﬁned by McWilliams and Siegel (2001) as “actions that appear to further some
social good, beyond the interests of the ﬁrm and that which is required by law.” It is considered as a corporate strategy/investment that
can enhance a company's competitive advantage in the long run. While the relationship between CSR and ﬁrm performance currently
receives much academic scrutiny (especially among the ethics and management ﬁelds of business studies), little attention has been paid
to the effect of location (geography) on CSR. We argue that much of the cross-sectional variation contained within CSR can be explained
by the local culture and community traits inherent at a ﬁrm's headquarters. Consistent with the emerging literature that examines the
relationship between geography and corporate strategy (see, e.g., John, Knyazeva, and Knyazeva (2011); Loughran and Schultz (2005);
Sorenson and Baum (2003)) geography/proximity has recently been shown to explain much of the cross-sectional variation of corporate
ﬁnance characteristics. In the context of CSR, Jiraporn, Jiraporn, Boeprasert, and Chang (2013) argue that the observable nature of CSR
makes it likely that ﬁrms are inﬂuenced by their geographic peers when formulating their own CSR policy. They show a signiﬁcant CSR
correlation between surrounding ﬁrms and, as a result, use zip codes as an exogenous proxy to evaluate CSR's impact on credit ratings.
Similarly, Di Giuli and Kostovetsky (2014) show that ﬁrms headquartered in Democratic-leaning states tend to score higher in CSR
than Republican-leaning states. Recent ﬁndings by Parsons, Sulaeman, and Titman (2014) show that ﬁnancial misconduct is also
inﬂuenced by a ﬁrm's geographic peers. We build on these ﬁndings and show that while peer inﬂuence does impact on a ﬁrm's CSR
proﬁle, socio-economic factors may be driving the location effect to a larger extent. We expand our study beyond zip codes to more
socially meaningful aggregates like the Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA), State, and Region.
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The literature clearly documents a relationship between ﬁrm HQ location and corporate behavior. However, the mechanism through
which geography affects corporate policies is not well understood. Stulz and Williamson (2003) address the possibility that geography
might proxy for the cultural effect in the ﬁnance world. They argue that the religion of a country has a signiﬁcant effect on the pro-
tections afforded to creditors, and that geographic variation in ﬁnancial characteristics is a manifestation of the cultural differences
between areas. Brown, Ivkovic, Smith, and Weisbenner (2008) document the effect of culture on ﬁnance and present evidence that
individual stock ownership is driven by community pressure, which is ultimately a function of the culture of the area.
In the current study, we evaluate what socio-economic factors may be responsible for inducing certain CSR proﬁles at certain lo-
cations. We identify whether the local culture places a greater emphasis on the common good; if advocates are responsible for pressuring
management to consider the ﬁrm's social impacts; or if managers, who are more connected with their employees and community, are
directing corporate policy for social perquisites. Notwithstanding the social or cultural motivations, legal or geographic obstructions
may also affect a ﬁrm's CSR, of which we attempt to disentangle the various effects.
Direct investigations of the impact of proximity within the U.S. on CSR are limited and focus on “metro” versus “non-metro”
comparisons. Boeprasert (2012) ﬁnds that ﬁrms locating further away from metropolitan areas are more likely to engage in CSR ac-
tivities as a way to reduce distance-related information asymmetry and agency conﬂict problems. On the other hand, Husted, Jamali,
and Saffar (2016) documented that ﬁrms located in CSR-active cities or near major U.S. cities and ﬁnancial centers are involved in more
positive CSR activities. The authors mainly attribute this ﬁnding to the spill-over of knowledge/learning regarding CSR practices (e.g.,
reduction of CSR cost in the context of CSR cost-beneﬁt framework) within CSR-active communities. Our study expands the current
literature by documenting the importance of the underlying socio-economic factors when considering the impact of a ﬁrm's location on
CSR. Speciﬁcally, we show that better educated and sophisticated societies with a propensity for the common good and a low tolerance
of illegal behavior are likely to have resident ﬁrms with higher levels of strength behavior (social responsibility) and lower levels of
concern behavior (irresponsible behavior).
Finally, we document the tendency for ﬁrms to conform within geographic locales but provide counter evidence that ﬁrms which
differentiate along CSR within their community tend to be more valuable. Furthermore, we ﬁnd that some cities (Austin, Hartford,
Minneapolis-St. Paul, Portland, and Seattle) as well as some states (California and District of Columbia) tend to house ﬁrms with
signiﬁcantly higher levels of socially responsible behavior. We also ﬁnd that some regions tend to house ﬁrms that engage in more
socially destructive behavior (the West South Central region as identiﬁed by the U.S. Census Bureau). We show that, when evaluating
Tobin's Q, the city location and even the state location of ﬁrms' HQ could proxy for CSR due to the relationship between socio-economic
factors and CSR. We also ﬁnd that ﬁrm value is positively associated with ﬁrms that cluster with respect to CSR within a city (MSA).
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related pertinent literature. Section 3 describes the data
used in the study along with the variable construction and methodologies employed. Section 4 presents the results of the study, with the
subsections expanding on our ﬁndings over various robustness concerns. Finally, section 5 offers some conclusions and implications of
our results.
2. Literature review
The geographic effect on corporate behaviors is not limited to Corporate Social Responsibility. Gao, Ng, and Wang (2011) show that
ﬁrms exhibit conformity in their ﬁnancing policies to those of their geographically proximate ﬁrms and that the location of ﬁrms'
headquarters explains some cross-sectional differences of capital structures in the U.S. Similarly, a geographic lens is used by Gran-
ovetter (1985) for corporate decisions, Kedia and Rajgopal (2009) for compensation policy, Mizruchi, Stearns, and Marquis (2006) for
corporate borrowing, Haunschild (1993) for acquisitions, and Marquis, Glynn, and Davis (2007) on charitable actions. Pirinsky and
Wang (2006) ﬁnd that stock returns experience co-movement in geographic clusters. Bebchuk and Cohen (2002) document that U.S.
states that offer stronger anti-takeover protection are more successful in retaining in-state ﬁrms and in attracting out-of-state in-
corporations. Finally, Card, Hallock, and Moretti (2010) ﬁnd that attracting and attaining the headquarters of traded ﬁrms increase
charitable donations to resident charities.
It is conceivable that the location effect is simply a reﬂection of a ﬁrm's propensity to satisfy local investor preference. Coval and
Moskowitz (1999) show that geographic proximity explains a signiﬁcant part of the portfolio allocation decision, as there is a relative
information advantage when investing in local ﬁrms. Similarly, U.S. money managers have a home bias preference, which is observed
for individual investors (Ivkovic &Weisbenner, 2005; Seasholes & Zhu, 2010), and internationally (Grinblatt & Keloharju, 2000). The
clustering of local investors with a speciﬁc investment appetite could have an inﬂuence on ﬁrm policies, creating a clientele effect
(Becker, Ivkovic, and Weisbenner, 2011). Similarly, a clientele effect might contribute to the location effect on CSR. If investor pref-
erence for local ﬁrms is strong enough, ﬁrms may structure their corporate actions to satisfy the desires of those investors who, in turn,
would be conditioned by the culture present in that community, indirectly creating a link between the cultural values of the locale and
ﬁrms located within. In the current study, our results support the notion that the level of CSR across ﬁrms relates to their geographic
location.
Due to the subjective nature of CSR, it is plausible that the culture of geography could affect a ﬁrm's CSR decisions based on the
cultural norms that dictate the common good and taboo. Stulz and Williamson (2003) draw on religion and language to proxy for
culture, explaining the cross-sectional differences in investor protections. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) study the cultural effect on
stock market investment behavior and ﬁnd that ﬁrms' ofﬁcial language and the cultural background of their chief executives affect stock
selections of both institutional and household investors. Barro and McCleary (2003) ﬁnd that macroeconomic development has a
negative correlation with church attendance across countries, while Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) ﬁnd that, across countries,
religious beliefs are associated with “good” economic attitudes, where good is deﬁned as conducive to higher per capita income and
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The U.S. is a geographically large and diverse country. Culture and other socioeconomic factors vary substantially across regions.
Thus, it is plausible that the location effect is potentially related to the immediate institutional environment or the social context of a
ﬁrm's location. Firms, in fact, do not make decisions but people do, and what they do outside of work is likely to affect how they make
these decisions at work (Hilary & Hui, 2009). While culture and other social factors can fundamentally shape the value and behavior of
corporate managers, social interaction can facilitate cultural transmission within a social context. Firm managers' immersion in social
networks serves as a major channel of conveying information and ideas about ﬁrm behavior (Granovetter, 1985). Hence, corporate
decision-making is, to a certain degree, rooted in ﬁrm managers' background.
Corporatemanagers, through bothmarket and nonmarket interactions with peers, can be inﬂuenced by network contacts in decision-
making. Social scientists suggest that analogy plays an important role in perceiving and framing the decision situation, as well as in
comparison of the alternatives. When operating in an uncertain environment, ﬁrm ofﬁcials may look to their peers for ideas about
appropriate strategies or mimic one another's behavior through direct contact. Recent studies suggest that social interaction with peers
has tangible effects on a wide range of ﬁrm activities from adoption of anti-takeover protections (Davis & Greve, 1997), corporate
borrowing (Mizruchi et al., 2006), acquisition decisions (Haunschild, 1993); to charitable actions and political contributions (Marquis
et al., 2007). John and Kadyrzhanova (2008) document robust evidence for peer effects in corporate governance. They ﬁnd that ﬁrms
are more likely to adopt anti-takeover protections if other ﬁrms headquartered in the same geographic area adopt them and that good
governance matters the most for corporate performance and policies when peers have good governance.
The social interaction effect can also play an important role in the geography of CSR because geographic proximity facilitates face-to-
face interaction and makes contact/relationship easier to start and maintain. Furthermore, geographic proximity facilitates observa-
tional learning even without direct contact. Simple exposure to the strategies of other CSR-active ﬁrms may prompt ﬁrms to adopt
similar strategies and to align their activities with those of other ﬁrms (and other players in the area such as news media, NGOs, and
universities, among others (see Taylor, 2005) in the local geographic community. These knowledge spillovers in CSR are acknowledged
by Husted et al. (2016) as the primary mechanism that alters the cost-beneﬁt functions of CSR allowing ﬁrms with closer proximity to
CSR-active cities to enjoy the lower cost of CSR activities. The authors also document the reduction in cost of equity as the major beneﬁt
of “positive/strength” CSR activities. They show that lowering of the cost of equity related to CSR is more pronounced in high CSR
density areas. Thus, we posit that social interaction matters for CSR; that is, ﬁrm managers may receive some input from their peers and
consider this information when making their ﬁrm's CSR decision. Extending this train of thought, the value of CSR might potentially
depend on knowledge spillovers.
We broaden the reach of this literature by studying peer effects on CSR. Peer effect has two distinct impacts on ﬁrm's decision to
engage in CSR. Firstly, if CSR functions as a channel through which management could extract social perquisites or increase ﬁrm value,
then they would have the incentive to increase the ﬁrm's CSR relative to neighboring ﬁrms. Such an effect would lend itself to
geographic clustering based on the value society places on CSR. Societies in which CSR is highly valued would provide signiﬁcant
beneﬁts to managers and/or ﬁrms to justify the expense of engaging in CSR. As one ﬁrm increases its CSR, other ﬁrms in the community
would see a drop-off in value extracted from CSR, inducing a pressure on other ﬁrms to increase their level of CSR.
The second peer effect impact works on a similar basis but with different results. We assume that there is no discernible geographic
cross-sectional difference in stakeholders' multi-attribute utility functions but that the bias toward local ﬁrms is signiﬁcantly strong.
Firms would then have the incentive to diversify along a CSR continuum within a local community. As the value extracted from CSR is
ﬁnite, it is plausible that few ﬁrms would capture the extreme ends of the CSR spectrum, while most ﬁrms would compete for the
attention of the majority stakeholders with a moderate appetite for CSR. Therefore, not only would geographic clustering not occur, but
that a geographic scattering might occur, as CSR ﬁrms spread geographically to absorb the local appetite for CSR.
3. Data and methodology
3.1. Data
This study is based principally on the Environmental Social and Governance (ESG) ratings developed by Kinder, Lydenberg, and
Domini (KLD). KLD is a proprietary database that rates securities from 1991, and the Russell 3000 from 2003, according to various
measures. The ratings fall within seven categories relating to community, corporate governance, diversity, employee relations, envi-
ronment, human rights, and product. The KLD data also rates securities in the Alcohol, Gambling, Firearms, Military, Nuclear Power, and
Tobacco industries according to exclusionary screening criteria. Each category has several subcategories representing possible strength
or responsible behavior (positive points) and concern or negative behavior (negative points). KLD analysts rate ﬁrms on their various
CSR characteristics annually by assigning a binary point to several subcategories within each aforementioned category. It is important to
note that the strength and concern scores within each category are not perfect opposites, nor are there equal amounts of possible strength
and concern within each category or across categories. We exclude stocks that have been marked as controversial and stocks that were
examined by KLD but failed to receive a score,1 in line with the literature.
The KLD data are matched with data from the Center for Research in Securities Prices (CRSP) for the period beginning 1991 through
2009. We average volume (volume), adjusted price (price), and adjusted number of shares outstanding (shares outstanding) for each
calendar year end t. Furthermore, income statement and balance sheet items are obtained by matching the CRSP data with Compustat
1 We also include these for robustness, with no discernible impact on our results.
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through CRSPlink.
We deﬁne a ﬁrm's location as the metropolitan statistical area (MSA) where the ﬁrm is headquartered (John et al., 2011; Pirinsky &
Wang, 2006). To classify location, we obtain data on state and zip code of companies' headquarters from Compustat. Using the zip code,
we merge the sample ﬁrms with the Metropolitan Areas and Components data deﬁned by the Ofﬁce of Management Bureau (OMB) as of
2005. The OMB deﬁnes an MSA according to the degree of social and economic integration between a core population nucleus and
adjacent communities. This results in the creation of MSAs that span multiple counties and sometimes multiple states. When controlling
for location we include only ﬁrms from MSAs with at least 10 sample ﬁrms per year, for at least 5 years, allowing no less than 50
ﬁrm-year observations per MSA. We obtain demographic information, at the county level and aggregate to the MSA, from the U.S.
Census Bureau Census 2000, as it falls exactly in the middle of our sample period. Cultural variables are obtained from World Value
Surveys (WVS) at the regional level. Information relating to charities and charitable receipts are obtained from the Urban Institutes'
National Center for Charitable Statistics at county level and aggregated to MSA. Tax data are obtained from the Chief Financial Ofﬁcer of
the District of Columbia's Annual Tax Rates and Tax Burdens Report for the largest city in each state. We apply the information to all
ﬁrms that are resident within the state. Crime data are obtained from the U.S. Department of Justice for each district court and
aggregated to state level.
3.1.1. Dependent variables
In the ﬁrst part of our study, where responsible behavior (strength) and irresponsible behavior (concern) (as the constituent parts of
CSR) function as our dependent variables, we proxy for CSR using the KLD STATS database. The KLD data have been extensively covered
in the literature, being the basis of many studies relating to CSR.2 The usual aggregation method of KLD takes the sum of strength net of
concern for each category
CSRjt ¼
Xujt
s¼1
strengthjs 
Xkjt
r¼1
concernjr (1)
and aggregates this into an overall score
CSRt ¼
X7
j¼1
CSRjt (2)
where CSRjt is the aggregated CSR score for category j in year t. Similarly, strength
j
s is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm meets strength s in category j,
otherwise 0; concernjr is equal to 1 if the ﬁrm meets concern r in category j, otherwise 0. As KLD data are binary with a heterogeneous
amount of strength and concern criteria allocated across various sub-categories, it could be misleading to look at a ﬁrm's ultimate score.
First, the result of the “netting off” process would obscure information, as concern and strength are not perfect opposites. Netting off
erroneously assumes all binary points are equal and opposite. The number of possible points varies not only across strength and concern
categories but also over subcategories; it then becomes difﬁcult to interpret the meaning of a whole number. Furthermore, comparing
and ranking CSR scores across ﬁrms proves difﬁcult if the range of possible CSR scores is conﬁned to only several integers. In this study,
each ﬁrm is assigned a percentage of possible points for both strength and concern, referred to as their level of CSR. This allows us to
compare a ﬁrm's performance across subcategories, between strength and concern, and across years. For example, if a ﬁrm scored one 1 of
the possible 4 for the strength section of the environmental category, it would be modiﬁed to 0.25, as there were four possible points
available, but only one point was awarded. Following, if the ﬁrm also scored 2 from a possible 10 points for the concern section of the
environmental category, a percentage score of 0.2 would be awarded. Under the binary system, the ﬁrm would have a net score of 1
(one strength less two concerns), while as a percentage the ﬁrm would have a Net CSR score of 0.05 (0.25 strengths less 0.2 concerns).
Formally, our aggregation takes the following form
CSRjt ¼
Pujt
s¼1strength
j
s
ujt

Pkjt
r¼1concern
j
r
kjt
(3)
with an overall score of
CSRt ¼
X7
j¼1
CSRjt
7
(4)
We employ Tobin's Q as a measure of performance in the second part of the study. Tobin's Q aims to incorporate the market's
adjustment to the ﬁrm's value with respect to CSR's effect on the present value of future cash ﬂows and the value generated from the asset
base. In line with the literature (Bebchuk& Cohen, 2005), we compute Tobin's Q as the market value of assets over book value of assets,
where market value is equal to book value of assets plus market value of common stock less sum of book value of common stock.
2 See (Chatterji, Levine, & Toffel, 2009), (Galema, Plantinga, & Scholtens, 2008), (Statman & Glushkov, 2009), (Jiao, 2010), (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013), (Cho, Lee, &
Pfeiffer Jr., 2013), and (El Ghoul, Guedhami, Kwok, & Mishra, 2011) for the use of the KLD dataset.
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Concerns have been raised regardingmeasurement errors contained in Tobin's Q (for an enlightening discussion, see Almeida, Campello,
& Galvao, 2010; Erickson &Whited, 2000; and Erickson &Whited, 2012). However, given that Tobin's Q is the dependent variable in
our analysis and Greene’s (2007, p. 326) assertion that “… measurement error in the dependent variable can be absorbed in the
disturbance of the regression and ignored …,” we believe that, in the absence of an accessible and well established alternative, any
measurement errors, if present, should not materially impact our analysis (Jiao, 2010).
3.1.2. Control variables
Drawing on previous work linking Tobin's Q and CSR we include the following control variables in our analysis. Firm size is
calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets, leverage is calculated as total liabilities over total assets, and turnover is calculated as
the natural logarithm of average monthly volume over shares outstanding at the end of each year t. Return on assets (ROA) is calculated
as earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) to total assets. Advertising is calculated as advertising expense over sales, research and design
(R&D) is R&D expenditure over sales, capital expenditure (CAPEX) is CAPEX over total assets. Finally, sales growth is calculated as the
change in sales at time t with respect to t-1.3 Cash ratio is calculated as cash and marketable securities to total assets at the end of each
year t.
3.1.3. Geographic variables
To account for any location based CSR peer effect we construct two measures. We test whether ﬁrms' CSR proﬁle is affected by the
CSR activities of their peers. Firstly, we examine the effect ﬁrms with high levels of CSR have on their peers. We posit that the presence of
a ﬁrm with high levels of strength or concernmight encourage other ﬁrms in the community to increase their level of CSR. We construct
the variable CSR D10 to indicate the proportion of ﬁrms within anMSA that are ranked in the 10th decile nationally (D10 being a dummy
indicating the tenth decile) and above for either strength or concern regardless of geographic location. To determine the decile, we rank
each ﬁrm within an industry for each year across all locations and aggregate ﬁrms in the 10th decile across all industries in each year.
Speciﬁcally, CSR D10 is the incidence of D10 in geographic area x (excluding ﬁrm i). We exclude the incidence of ﬁrm i being D10 when
computing the variable. Speciﬁcally:
CSR D10 ¼ bE iðD10jxÞ (5)
where
bE iðD10jxÞ ¼
P
j2x=½iD10
Nx  1 (6)
CSR D10 is the incidence of D10 in geographic area x (excluding ﬁrm i). Secondly, we model the effect of the average level of strength
and concern (Group_CSR) within an MSA, again not including the score of ﬁrm i. Speciﬁcally,
GroupCSR ¼ bE iðCSRjxÞ (7)
where
bE iðCSRjxÞ ¼
P
j2x=½iCSRj
Nx  1 (8)
To account for investor clientele in a location, we construct three variables Education,Wealth, and Sophistication in line with Gao et al.
(2011) and Pirinsky and Wang (2006). We proxy for local economic development with personal income whereWealth is the per capita
personal income at the MSA level. We proxy for the ﬁnancial sophistication of local residents with investment income where Sophis-
tication is the per capita investment income at the MSA level. We obtain income data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. Next, we
obtain education data, at the county level and aggregate to MSA level, from the U.S. Census Bureau Census 2000. The percent of the
population over 25 with a bachelor's degree or more proxies for the level of education in an area (Education).
In line with Stulz and Williamson (2003), Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000), and Guiso et al. (2003), we account for the cultural
difference across locations. We deﬁne two variables Protestant and Trust. Protestant is the percentage of people who belong to Protestant
religions based on the question: “Do you belong to a religious denomination? If yes, which one?” Trust proxies for interpersonal and is
deﬁned as the percentage of respondents who answered “yes” to the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can
be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” The data are obtained from the World Values Survey. We take the
average survey responses conducted in 1990, 1995, and 2000 for each U.S. Census region.
Similar to Card et al. (2010) and Marquis et al. (2007) we include ﬁve variables to account for the effect charities might have on the
community. #Charities is the number of non-proﬁt organizations registered within an MSA. Char.Rev/Pop is the per capita charitable
revenue, speciﬁcally, the natural logarithm of the total revenue raised by nonproﬁt organizations in an MSA to the resident population
within the MSA. Rev/Char is the total charitable revenue within an MSA to the number of nonproﬁt organizations. Nonproﬁt organi-
zations are deﬁned as those registered with the IRS that ﬁled Form 990 within 24months of the database date selected. This information
3 Coded missing values to zero to ensure robust sample size (Himmelberg, Hubbard, & Palia, 1999).
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is obtained from the IRS Business Master Files (1995–2009) available through the National Center for Charitable Statistics. Resident
population is obtained at the zip code level and aggregated to MSA level from the U.S. Census 2000. Lastly, we include Giving, deﬁned as
charitable giving to adjusted gross income by county, aggregated to MSA, as reported on IRS tax return Form 1040, Schedule A, by
households that itemize deductions, from IRS Tax Return Summary Files (1997–2008), obtained from the National Center for Charitable
statistics.
Furthermore, we include tax-related data from the annual Tax Rates and Tax Burdens report prepared by the Ofﬁce of the Chief
Financial Ofﬁcer for the District of Columbia for the years 1997 through 2009. Speciﬁcally, we compute the tax regressivity or Tax
Burden, for each state as the ratio of the estimated burden of major taxes for a hypothetical family of three earning $25,000 to the
estimated burden of major taxes for a hypothetical family of three earning $75,000 in the largest city in each state. We posit that tax
burdens would indicate the community's propensity to sacriﬁce personal wealth in the interest of the common good. Speciﬁcally, a more
regressive local tax structure would be indicative of a community where individuals in lower socio-economic circumstances bear a
greater share of the tax burden, perhaps signaling the community's unwillingness or inability to constrain the behavior of the wealthier,
more powerful, members of the community. Ultimately, such a cultural context could inﬂuence ﬁrms' CSR decisions.
Lastly, drawing on Case and Katz (1991) we include crime data to account for the community's tolerance of illegal or socially un-
desirable behavior. Fraud is the number of fraud related prosecutions to total prosecutions ﬁled for all U.S. Federal Judicial district
courts within a state. Regulatory is the number of regulatory related offenses prosecuted to total prosecutions ﬁled for all U.S. Federal
Judicial district courts within a state. Tax Offenses is the number of tax related prosecutions to total prosecutions ﬁled for all U.S. Federal
Judicial district courts within a state. Environmental is the number of environment related prosecutions to total prosecutions ﬁled for all
U.S. Federal Judicial district courts within a state. They are obtained from Bureau of Justice statistics where we utilize the broad
Table 1
Descriptive statistics.
Panel A: Financial Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Adjusted Price 26,562 $28.66 $58.06 $1 $3561
Adjusted Shares ('000) 26,562 204,401 588,845 372 22,900,000
Average Monthly Volume ('000) 26,562 1,317,066 5,372,910 189 484,000,000
Market Capitalization ('000) 26,562 $5,925,838 $19,900,000 $5831 $602,000,000
Tobin's Q 26,160 2.00 1.80 0.34 56.98
Ln(Total Assets) 26,166 7.43 1.72 3.89 12.14
Ln(Turnover) 26,562 1.65 1.09 4.43 7.74
Book to Market (%) 25,503 55.45 43.63 4.41 275.77
EBIT to Assets (%) 26,149 6.80 11.91 50.20 35.64
Cash to Total Assets (%) 26,162 16.03 20.01 0.00 99.95
Leverage (%) 26,098 57.46 27.83 0.21 771.17
R&D over Sales (%) 26,057 8.99 39.25 0.00 331.75
CAPEX over Total Assets (%) 26,166 4.49 5.35 0.00 29.38
Advertising over Sales (%) 8694 3.35 7.05 0.00 332.23
Sales Growth (%) 17,365 25.34 46.70 63.53 260.90
Panel B: Demographic Variable Descriptive Statistics
Strength 26,565 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.49
Concern 26,565 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.51
Strength CSR D10 18,904 0.0936 0.0943 0 1
Concern CSR D10 18,904 0.0928 0.1014 0 1
Strength Group_CSR 18,926 0.0436 0.0211 0 0.2954
Concern Group_CSR 18,926 0.0703 0.0253 0 0.3925
Strength Difference 18,926 0.0101 0.0488 0.2726 0.4319
Concern Difference 18,926 0.0109 0.0615 0.3925 0.4250
Education 20,416 27.7421 8.1008 6.5022 57.1333
Wealth 20,364 $40,199 $9838 $14,515 $80,139
Sophistication 20,364 $7094 $2551 $1568 $39,645
Protestant % 20,538 30.8835 7.1390 21.3178 44.8980
Trust % 20,538 37.4726 3.5794 24.1791 40.2961
# Charities 20,362 3.1230E-04 3.8530E-04 1.4500E-05 4.5461E-03
Revenue per Charity 20,362 1.2400E-05 1.6100E-05 2.3900E-07 4.1310E-04
Revenue per Charity 20,362 4.3363E-02 1.6998E-02 1.2483E-03 1.9082E-01
Average giving % 15,257 1.9513 0.5067 0.0000 6.3804
Tot. Char. Rev. (‘000) 20,362 $28,700,000 $34,300,000 $1748 $132,000,000
Tax Regressivity 18,790 1.1532 0.3687 0.4409 2.5366
Fraud Prosecutions % 18,456 3.2586 1.4479 0.7318 20.6272
Regulatory offenses % 18,456 0.1974 0.3172 0.0000 7.3419
Tax Offenses % 18,456 0.2089 0.1066 0.0000 1.7015
Environmental Offenses % 18,456 0.0307 0.0503 0.0000 0.8213
Panel A reports the ﬁnancial descriptive statistics for the pooled sample spanning calendar years 1991 through 2009. (‘000) indicate ﬁgures presented in thousands and
(%) indicate ﬁgures in a percentage or ratio. EBIT is earnings before interest and tax, Ln(Total Assets) is the natural logarithm of Total Assets, ln(Turnover) is the natural
logarithm of volume to shares outstanding, leverage is Total Liabilities over Total Assets. Panel B reports the demographic variables descriptive statistics for the pooled
sample spanning calendar years 1991 through 2009. (‘000) indicate ﬁgures presented in thousands and (%) indicate ﬁgures in a percentage or ratio.
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categories deﬁned by the Bureau of Justice statistics and code all withheld prosecutions in a district court to ﬁve. The appendix displays
the list of geographic variables used in this study to reference for convenience.
3.1.4. Descriptive statistics
Table 1, Panel A, presents the ﬁnancial descriptive statistics for the pooled sample spanning years 1991 through 2009. In addition,
Panel B presents the demographic variable descriptive statistics for the pooled sample spanning calendar years 1991 through 2009, as
deﬁned in the appendix. The incidence of a CSR leader (CSR D10) is around 10 percent while the average level of CSR within MSAs
(Group_CSR) that qualify is slightly higher than the pooled averages at 0.04, for strength and 0.07, for concern. Alternatively, the
average difference between ﬁrm i's level of CSR and the average within the MSA is negative 0.01, for both strength and concern. The
combination for these statistics indicate that the average level of CSR within each city is skewed by the presence of a CSR leader.
Moreover, on average 27 percent of residents within the MSAs have an education (bachelor's degree or higher), with an average
income of $40,000, and $7000 to invest. Around 30 percent of the MSAs are home to individuals who identify as Protestant and 37
percent of individuals would trust “most” people. On average, there are 30 charities per 100,000 people, raising $1235 per person on
average each year. However, the total amount of charitable revenues raised within an MSA to the number of charities is $4,000,000, on
average. Furthermore, individuals contributed around 2 percent of earnings to charity each year, with the average total amount of
charitable receipts within an MSA topping $28 bn. with the lowest being $1.7 mil. and highest being $132 bn. The average MSA has a
regressive tax structure with the tax burden being 15 percent greater on families earning $25,000 compared to families earning $75,000.
Lastly, fraud prosecutions present the largest share of offenses reported in our study with 3 percent of total ﬁlings; environmental of-
fenses the lowest at 0.03 percent. Lastly, Table 2, Panel A, presents the descriptive statistics of the strength and concern scores for each of
the 12 MSAs with at least 10 resident ﬁrms per year for at least 10 years.4 In addition, the averages across the MSAs are presented in
Fig. 1 and Fig. 2. As can clearly be seen, Minneapolis-St. Paul has signiﬁcantly more strength than the other MSAs, followed by San Jose.
Alternatively, the southern cities of Atlanta and Houston have quite low levels of strength. The CSR proﬁle of Houston and Minneapolis
are quite interesting as both reverse course, in terms of concern, with Houston having some of the highest levels of concern, and
Minneapolis-St. Paul with some of the lowest. To aid understanding, we show the geographic clustering of CSR visually in Fig. 3 and
Fig. 4. As Fig. 3 shows, average CSR seems to be higher on the coasts, speciﬁcally the Northeast and Northwest, with Midwestern and
Southern states generally showing lower levels of CSR. When considered at the MSA (city) level, the clustering in the Northeast and
Northwestern portions of the contiguous states are still present.
Table 2
CSR scores across metropolitan statistical areas.
Panel A: CSR Scores Across Metropolitan Statistical Areas
MSA Strength Concern
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Freq.
Atlanta 0.0281 0.0419 0.0663 0.0611 499
Boston 0.0295 0.0368 0.0430 0.0369 916
Chicago 0.0372 0.0492 0.0627 0.0620 1064
Cincinnati 0.0484 0.0600 0.0742 0.0659 261
Dallas-Fort Worth 0.0342 0.0488 0.0825 0.0752 671
Houston 0.0244 0.0288 0.0786 0.0693 923
Minneapolis-St. Paul 0.0535 0.0590 0.0499 0.0511 575
New York 0.0407 0.0592 0.0653 0.0661 2333
Philadelphia 0.0325 0.0431 0.0601 0.0677 679
San Francisco 0.0381 0.0480 0.0627 0.0594 788
San Jose 0.0465 0.0632 0.0579 0.0392 964
Washington 0.0405 0.0514 0.0422 0.0409 548
Average 0.0375 0.0515 0.0623 0.0608 10,221
Panel B: Tests For The Homogeneity of Variances and Means
Test Strength Concern
ANOVA: Equality of means 20.10 30.89
(0.00) (0.000)
Levene's test: Homogeneity of variances 8.99 7.086
(0.00) (0.00)
Brown-Forsyth modiﬁcation (medium) 5.49 5.21
(0.00) (0.00)
Brown-Forsyth modiﬁcation (10% trim) 5.85 5.37
(0.00) (0.00)
N 18,359 18,359
4 We focus on the largest MSAs for parsimony.
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3.2. Methodology
We perform a baseline regression by regressing each CSR variable on year end ﬁxed effects, industry ﬁxed effects and control
variables. We then include location ﬁxed effects of headquarters and examine the joint signiﬁcance and explanatory power of ﬁrm
locations. Speciﬁcally, we estimate the following regression in line with Gao et al. (2011):
yit ¼ αþ β01X þ β
0
2Lþ δit þ γit þ εi;t (9)
where yit represents the CSR variable, β1'X is the vector of ﬁrm-level control variables, β2'L is the vector of location ﬁxed effects,
δit and γit are the year and industry
5
ﬁxed effects, respectively. represents the ﬁxed effects of location, accounted for by a dummy for
each sample MSA (Metropolitan Statistical Area), State, or Region, taking the value of 1 if a ﬁrm is headquartered there and 0 otherwise.
εi;t is an error term. In each model we cluster standard errors at the ﬁrm level to account for within ﬁrm correlation over time.
4. Results
Table 2, Panel B, reports the results of the equality of ‘means’ and ‘variances’ tests. Speciﬁcally, we test whether the mean strength
and concern scores are jointly equal for all MSAs across our sample. The result of the ANOVA regression strongly rejects this, with the
joint F-test signiﬁcant at p< 0.01 or more for both strength and concern. This conﬁrms the intuition that the level of CSR varies among
ﬁrms located in different metropolitan areas of the U.S., with at least one MSA's average CSR statistically different from the other MSAs'
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Fig. 1. Percentage Strength Per Metropolitan Statistical Area. This ﬁgure illustrates the differences in strength across the 12 metropolitan statistical areas with at
least ten ﬁrms resident for ten years during the sample period.
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Fig. 2. Percentage Concern Per Metropolitan Statistical Area. This ﬁgure illustrates the differences in strength across the 12 metropolitan statistical areas with at
least ten ﬁrms resident for ten years during the sample period.
5 Following Jiraporn et al. (2014), we control for possible industry effects in two ways. The primary way is to include industry dummies corresponding to the ﬁrst two
digits of the standard industrial classiﬁcation (SIC) code in the regressions. The second way is to take the average level of CSR within an industry and uses that variable
as a control in the regression as opposed to dummies. The latter gives qualitatively similar results and is not reported in the manuscript for brevity.
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average. Next, we test whether the variance around the mean for strength and concern are homogenous. Speciﬁcally, we employ Levene's
test for homogeneity around variances (Levene, 1960) and ﬁnd the F-test results to be signiﬁcant at p0.01 for both strength and concern,
rejecting the null hypothesis of homogenous variance across MSAs. Next, we adjust the Levene test according to Brown and Forsythe
(1974) and replace the mean with the medium or a 10% trim, to compensate for non-normality. Again, we comfortably reject the null
hypothesis of homogeneity across MSAs. Our results indicate that ﬁrms headquartered in at least one MSA experience a statistically
different level of CSR and/or variance around the CSR compared to ﬁrms located in other MSAs. This ﬁnding differentiates our work
from Boeprasert (2012) and Husted et al. (2016),6 as we extend the geography of CSR by emphasizing on possible variations among CSR
levels across different metropolitan areas in the U.S.A.
For a formal test, we regress MSA level location ﬁxed effects in accordance with equation (9) and control for other determinants of
CSR activities7 known in literature. Table 3, Panel A, presents our results. Models (1) and (2) present the results with strength and concern
as the dependent variables, respectively. In addition, we also include Net CSR and No_Gov as dependent variables in models (3) and (4).
Although we have expressed some concern around Net CSR measures, we believe Net CSR is less sensitive to ﬁrm size and is included for
robustness. Similarly, we also include a CSR measure that excludes the governance category; some criticism has been levied around the
KLD Governance category and the differences with conventional corporate governance concepts (Chang, Kim,& Li, 2014; Jo & Harjoto,
2011). Lastly, although we already include industry ﬁxed effects in ﬁrst four models, for additional robustness, we restrict our sample for
each industry. For parsimony, we include the results for the manufacturing and service industries in models (5) and (6) respectively. It
should be noted that we selected these two industries to determine whether high intangible asset industries (service) could drive some of
our results relative to other industries or those with a signiﬁcant reliance on tangible assets (manufacturing).
Overall, as expected, the variables indicating a ﬁrm's size and ability to access funds (Size and Cash ratio) are positively and
signiﬁcantly associated with all CSR measures. The positive regression coefﬁcients on ﬁrm size are consistent with the interpretation by
Chih, Chih, and Chen (2010); Udayasankar (2008). Firm size creates different economic motivations due to visibility, resource access
(e.g., cash), and scale of operations. That is, strategic value of CSR is dependent on the size of the company. Speciﬁcally, Udayasankar
(2008) predicts that CSR activities should be particularly valuable for ﬁrms that are either extremely large or extremely small. Given that
KLD data used in our study (as well as Boeprasert (2012); Husted et al. (2016); and others) cover rather larger companies, it is the
positive relationship between ﬁrm size and CSR activities that are captured in our sample.
The variables, Turnover and Leverage, are signiﬁcant and negative for responsible behavior, while growth (Sales growth) is negative for
both strength, concern, and overall CSR. As described by Neubaum and Zahra (2006), short-term institutional investors are more active in
Fig. 3. Net CSR Per State. This ﬁgure illustrates the differences in CSR across states within our sample. As the legend indicates, each state is assigned a color gradient
corresponding to the standard deviation from the mean level of CSR over the sample period.
6 Husted et al. (2016) focus on only ‘strength’ CSR in their study. We also consider ‘concerns’ and ‘net’ CSR throughout our study.
7 A comprehensive review of determinants of corporate CSR activities can be found in Campbell (2007) and Chih et al. (2010).
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their trading. Their shorter investment horizon shifts their focus on creating short-term value. Generally, CSR activities are long-term
corporate strategies aiming to establish long-term competitive advantages, these investors will be less enthusiastic about encouraging
CSR activities of the company that do not add value in the short term. Thus, the negative relationship between CSR and turnover reﬂects
the short-term institutional investors' preference. Sales growth may indirectly proxy for growth opportunities or competition. As noted
by Campbell (2007) and Shleifer (2004) ﬁrms operating in an extremely competitive business environment may be motivated to act
irresponsibly due to narrow proﬁt margin that puts shareholder value at risk.
In line with research, CAPEX and R&D are positively associated with responsible behavior (Servaes & Tamayo, 2013) and Net CSR.
Inversely, R&D and CAPEX are negatively, but not signiﬁcantly, associated with respect to concern. It would seem that R&D and CAPEX
might provide ﬁrms with the technical capacity and resources to positively engage stakeholders. Based on resource-based view (RBV)
theory, McWilliams and Siegel (2000) establish the positive correlation between R&D intensity and CSR. The rationale is that both R&D
and CSR are activities that uniquely add to the competitive advantage of the company. Both emphasize on special intangible resources
that are relatively difﬁcult to imitate and substitute. It follows, therefore, that companies which highly value R&D would also highly
value CSR activities. Padgett and Galan (2010) formally verify the causal effect of R&D on CSR activities, especially among
manufacturing industries, as can be seen in our model (5) results. As expected, ROA is signiﬁcantly associated with all measures of CSR.
It would seem that proﬁtability, like cashﬂow, allows ﬁrms to tackle CSR concerns with a reduction in negative behavior and an increase
in positive behavior overall. In Campbell (2007)'s quote, “Corporations will be less likely to act in socially responsible ways where they
are currently experiencing weak ﬁnancial performance.”
The location ﬁxed effects indicate that ﬁrms' headquarter location is signiﬁcantly related to levels of CSR. The joint test of signif-
icance for the location ﬁxed effect dummies is signiﬁcant at the p< 0.01 or less for all measures of CSR. Location is associated with ﬁrm
level CSR whether we consider strength, concern or Net CSR measures. These results are robust to concerns around KLD's governance
category. Notably, our results are robust to the inclusion of industry level controls as well as restricting our results to speciﬁc industries.
Even within industries, whether high or low intangible assets, the location effects are highly signiﬁcant.
Evaluating the location speciﬁc levels of CSR could be problematic, as any interpretation is relative to the level of CSR in New York
(the omitted ﬁxed effect). Nevertheless, Minneapolis-St. Paul (MN), San Jose (CA), Seattle (WA), andWashington (DC) stand out as some
Fig. 4. Net CSR Per Metropolitan Statistical Area. This ﬁgure illustrates the differences in CSR across metropolitan statistical areas within our sample. As the legend
indicates, each city is assigned a color gradient corresponding to the standard deviation from the mean level of CSR over the sample period.
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Table 3
Geography and CSR.
Panel A: Metropolitan Statistical Area and Firm Head Quarter Location
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strength Concern Net CSR No Gov. Man Service
Cash Ratio 0.0265*** 0.0277*** 0.5000** 0.6296*** 0.8711** 1.0741**
(0.0048) (0.0054) (0.2540) (0.2393) (0.3972) (0.4771)
Size 0.0155*** 0.0188*** 0.0976** 0.2921*** 0.2167** 0.1365*
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0493) (0.0472) (0.0983) (0.0824)
Turnover 0.0062*** 0.0008 0.2755*** 0.1575*** 0.2614*** 0.1051
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0491) (0.0462) (0.0804) (0.0940)
Leverage 0.0082*** 0.0023 0.2781 0.3289* 0.4257 0.3538
(0.0030) (0.0039) (0.1799) (0.1714) (0.3053) (0.3101)
R&D 0.0032** 0.0026 0.2222*** 0.2881*** 0.3781*** 0.0659
(0.0016) (0.0020) (0.0860) (0.0807) (0.1160) (0.1920)
CAPEX 0.0716*** 0.0021 2.6590*** 2.5698*** 0.8514 0.3338
(0.0166) (0.0212) (0.9551) (0.9313) (2.0619) (1.4202)
Advertising 0.0846*** 0.0175 3.5694*** 3.7494*** 9.2324*** 0.9395
(0.0252) (0.0228) (1.2379) (1.1781) (2.8109) (1.9853)
ROA 0.0199*** 0.0162** 1.3996*** 1.5960*** 2.0183*** 2.3365***
(0.0063) (0.0074) (0.3407) (0.3289) (0.5879) (0.6404)
Sales Growth 0.0007*** 0.0004* 0.0187** 0.0309*** 0.0186 0.0016
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0077) (0.0074) (0.0125) (0.0191)
Atlanta-Sandy Springs-Marietta 0.0077 0.0033 0.5773** 0.6979*** 1.2461** 0.0552
Austin-Round Rock-San Marcos 0.0216 0.0080 0.8648 0.6642 0.2871 0.8106*
Baltimore-Towson 0.0074 0.0033 0.5415 0.5929 1.3290 0.9157*
Birmingham-Hoover 0.0109 0.0126 0.2629 0.3493 0.5954 3.6352***
Boston-Cambridge-Quincy 0.0023 0.0145*** 0.4170** 0.3393* 0.0425 0.9044**
Bridgeport-Stamford-Norwalk 0.0097 0.0143** 0.8082 0.7407 1.1491 0.4166
Charlotte-Gastonia-Rock Hill 0.0089 0.0011 0.7140 0.9835* 0.0514 2.8672***
Chicago-Joliet-Naperville 0.0028 0.0015 0.2093 0.2383 0.5513 0.8551
Cincinnati-Middletown 0.0018 0.0030 0.2743 0.5360 0.5207 0.3252
Cleveland-Elyria-Mentor 0.0157** 0.0113** 0.5025 0.3979 0.6612 0.0459
Columbus 0.0208** 0.0071 0.7840 0.8321* 0.3487 –
Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington 0.0073 0.0103 0.6455* 0.7516** 1.5002** 1.4030***
Denver-Aurora-Broomﬁeld 0.0107** 0.0004 0.5236* 0.5451** 0.3042 0.0744
Detroit-Warren-Livonia 0.0076 0.0037 0.0368 0.2051 1.3462** 2.8302***
Hartford-West Hartford-East 0.0131 0.0145 0.9924** 1.0554*** 0.1566 0.0000
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown 0.0098** 0.0075 0.7790*** 0.8695*** 1.5797*** 0.1849
Indianapolis-Carmel 0.0023 0.0066 0.0260 0.0251 0.6610 0.1101
Jacksonville 0.0214*** 0.0088 1.4811** 1.3330** 1.5786*** 0.0328
Kansas City 0.0087 0.0026 0.5374 0.5784* 1.4705** 0.9018*
Los Angeles-Long Beach 0.0003 0.0004 0.0507 0.1140 0.3772 0.1588
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strength Concern Net CSR No Gov. Man Service
Memphis 0.0108 0.0111 0.2183 0.5331 1.3210** –
Miami-Fort Lauderdale 0.0022 0.0072 0.3694 0.4996* 0.5593 0.6227
Milwaukee 0.0012 0.0133* 0.1085 0.1833 0.2030 0.5112
Minneapolis-St.Paul 0.0149* 0.0120** 0.8486** 0.8504** 1.1608** 0.3587
Nashville 0.0090 0.0130 0.9326** 0.8853** 1.7586*** 0.7784
Oxnard-Thousand Oaks-Ventura 0.0060 0.0105 0.0625 0.0631 0.2573 1.4856***
Philadelphia 0.0013 0.0007 0.2022 0.3397 1.0381** 0.0036
Phoenix-Mesa-Glendale 0.0078 0.0069 0.6121 0.6345* 0.1971 0.5405
Pittsburgh 0.0049 0.0008 0.5345 0.6170 1.3110** 0.8856*
Portland-Vancouver-Hillsboro 0.0114 0.0156** 0.8768* 0.8148* 0.0219 1.4099*
Richmond 0.0097 0.0091 0.4515 0.7400* 0.1616 –
Salt Lake City 0.0013 0.0042 0.5407 0.6564* 1.0455 1.7391***
San Antonio-New Braunfels 0.0159 0.0079 1.1640** 1.2173** 1.9946*** 1.5626**
San Diego-Carlsbad-San Marcos 0.0020 0.0130** 0.3200 0.3959* 0.1171 0.8276
San Francisco-Oakland-Fremont 0.0063 0.0010 0.1673 0.2025 0.6452 1.4359***
San Jose-Sunnyvale-Santa Clara 0.0126** 0.0113** 0.8537*** 0.8870*** 0.5246 0.8641**
Seattle-Tacoma-Bellevue 0.0164* 0.0068 0.6819* 0.3947 0.6539 0.4509
St. Louis 0.0085 0.0061 0.7288*** 0.7896*** 1.4768*** 0.4726
Tampa-St. Petersburg 0.0178** 0.0060 0.8171** 0.9278** 1.4084*** 0.9586
Washington DC 0.0122** 0.0150*** 0.8676*** 0.7705** 0.8656** 0.4193
Intercept 0.0617*** 0.0881*** 0.4044 1.769*** 1.4235* 2.2278**
(0.0088) (0.0097) (0.4219) (0.4080) (0.8124) (1.0468)
N 14,272 14,272 14,272 14,272 5646 2263
R2 0.311 0.285 0.150 0.183 0.184 0.228
(continued on next page)
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Table 3 (continued )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strength Concern Net CSR No Gov. Man Service
adj. R2 0.307 0.282 0.146 0.179 0.174 0.206
MSA_F 2.154 1.857 2.874 3.429 7.183 19.6032
MSA_p 0.0000 0.0009 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster S.E (Firm) Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Panel B: State and Firm Head Quarter Location
Cash Ratio 0.0322*** 0.0258*** 0.8296*** 0.8296*** 1.1730*** 1.4635***
(0.0048) (0.0053) (0.2522) (0.2522) (0.3993) (0.4735)
Size 0.0146*** 0.0169*** 0.1236** 0.1236** 0.2588** 0.1367
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0484) (0.0484) (0.1043) (0.0839)
Turnover 0.0047*** 0.0030*** 0.2890*** 0.2890*** 0.2156*** 0.1333
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0478) (0.0478) (0.0821) (0.0890)
Leverage 0.0127*** 0.0112*** 0.1418 0.1418 0.4166 0.2547
(0.0037) (0.0041) (0.1797) (0.1797) (0.3124) (0.3211)
R&D 0.0072*** 0.0036 0.1625* 0.1625* 0.3595*** 0.1102
(0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0926) (0.0926) (0.1181) (0.1883)
CAPEX 0.0741*** 0.0880*** 0.3540 0.3540 0.8514 0.3983
(0.0146) (0.0187) (0.7618) (0.7618) (2.1572) (1.4093)
Advertising 0.1088*** 0.0524** 3.5075*** 3.5075*** 8.5772*** 0.0770
(0.0275) (0.0244) (1.2412) (1.2412) (2.8115) (2.1127)
ROA 0.0320*** 0.0028 1.2802*** 1.2802*** 1.6824*** 2.1545***
(0.0067) (0.0076) (0.3427) (0.3427) (0.5791) (0.6525)
Sales Growth 0.0007*** 0.0004* 0.0192** 0.0192** 0.0184 0.0052
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0077) (0.0077) (0.0123) (0.0178)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strength Concern Net CSR No Gov. Man Service
AL 0.0224** 0.0211 0.3631 0.3631 0.4436* 4.4178***
AZ 0.0155*** 0.0137 1.1136** 1.1136** 0.1956 0.2457
CO 0.0234*** 0.0007 1.0280*** 1.0280*** 0.2284 0.9079*
CT 0.0074 0.0080 0.5668 0.5668 0.9525 1.0949**
DC 0.0345*** 0.0273*** 2.1368*** 2.1368*** 1.6019*** 0.2504
DE 0.0184 0.0526 1.1415 1.1415 3.8431*** 2.6264***
FL 0.0181*** 0.0059 1.0168*** 1.0168*** 0.8839** 0.4482
GA 0.0122** 0.0094 0.9096*** 0.9096*** 1.2009** 0.7664**
IL 0.0078 0.0018 0.4641* 0.4641* 0.5757 0.0322
IN 0.0063 0.0074 0.4664 0.4664 0.6402 1.0151
KS 0.0162 0.0093 0.9011* 0.9011* 1.8206*** 0.8117
KY 0.0327*** 0.0203* 2.6273*** 2.6273*** 3.0128*** 1.5401***
MA 0.0045 0.0094** 0.0355 0.0355 0.2233 0.0048
MD 0.0130*** 0.0102 0.2347 0.2347 0.8691 0.2344
MI 0.0028 0.0077 0.2410 0.2410 1.3833** 1.9706***
MN 0.0128* 0.0048 0.5704* 0.5704* 1.2447** 0.5001
MO 0.0151*** 0.0065 0.9657*** 0.9657*** 1.3880*** 0.3460
NC 0.0091 0.0115 1.0011 1.0011 0.0085 3.6750***
NH 0.0752** 0.0056* 2.8739** 2.8739** 3.7037*** 0.0548
NJ 0.0092 0.0000 0.3797* 0.3797* 0.1722 0.7775**
NY 0.0050 0.0020 0.1853 0.1853 0.1049 0.8582**
OH 0.0120* 0.0010 0.6787** 0.6787** 0.3578 0.2722
OR 0.0066 0.0143 0.6442 0.6442 0.0859 1.2055**
PA 0.0092** 0.0000 0.5631** 0.5631** 1.0208*** 0.4338
TN 0.0062 0.0151* 0.8589** 0.8589** 1.5044*** 1.5760**
TX 0.0142*** 0.0142*** 1.1087*** 1.1087*** 1.3044*** 1.4744***
UT 0.0091 0.0059 0.8709** 0.8709** 0.9223 2.7798***
VA 0.0076 0.0053 0.2459 0.2459 0.0744 0.7612**
WA 0.0098 0.0024 0.3586 0.3586 0.6964 0.4649
WI 0.0002 0.0020 0.1571 0.1571 0.0725 0.2709
_cons 0.0548*** 0.0794*** 0.4474 0.4474 1.6987** 1.5587
(0.0089) (0.0100) (0.3865) (0.3865) (0.7455) (1.1114)
N 14,272 14,272 14,272 14,272 5646 2263
R2 0.285 0.236 0.130 0.130 0.183 0.206
adj. R2 0.282 0.233 0.126 0.126 0.175 0.185
State_F 7.2078 2.8192 3.9929 3.9929 20.358 25.769
State_p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
(continued on next page)
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of the locations where ﬁrm level CSR is signiﬁcantly higher. For example, on average, ﬁrms located in Minneapolis would have
signiﬁcantly higher levels of strength (0.0149), lower levels of concern (0.0120), and higher levels of Net CSR (0.8486) than ﬁrms
located in the New York MSA. Alternatively, Dallas (TX), Nashville (TN), San Antonio (TX), and Jacksonville (FL) are locations where
ﬁrm level CSR is signiﬁcantly lower. Firms located in San Antonio have Net CSR levels signiﬁcantly lower (1.1640) than those in New
York, these results are more pronounced for the Manufacturing and Service industries (1.9946 and1.5626, respectively). We caution
the interpretation of the ﬁxed effects, as they are very sensitive to the omitted location in each model. Omitting Minneapolis-St Paul
(MN), for example, would generate extremely negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcients for most locations.
Table 3, Panel B, shows the results when State headquarters location is used as the ﬁxed effect. Again, strength, concern, Net CSR,
No_Gov are the dependent variables for models (1) through (4), respectively, while Net CSR is the dependent variable in models (5) and
(6) for the manufacturing and service industries, respectively. The location ﬁxed effects indicate that ﬁrms' headquarters location (State)
is signiﬁcantly related to levels of CSR. The joint test of signiﬁcance for the location ﬁxed effect dummies is signiﬁcant at the p< 0.01 or
less for all measures of CSR. Location is associated with ﬁrm level CSR whether we consider strength, concern or Net CSRmeasures. These
results are robust to concerns around KLD's governance category and are robust to the inclusion of industry level controls as well as
restricting the results to speciﬁc industries with high or low intangible assets.
Looking at speciﬁc State location effects the District of Columbia, Minnesota (typically labeled as a philanthropy hub, Hopfensperger
(2016)) and NewHampshire have signiﬁcantly higher levels of CSR relative to California (the omitted ﬁxed effect). Firms headquartered
Table 3 (continued )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strength Concern Net CSR No Gov. Man Service
Cluster S.E (Firm) Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
Panel C: Region and Firm Headquarter Location
Cash Ratio 0.0328*** 0.0263*** 0.8669*** 0.8669*** 1.0908*** 1.3191***
(0.0050) (0.0054) (0.2532) (0.2532) (0.3930) (0.4900)
Size 0.0147*** 0.0170*** 0.1266** 0.1266** 0.2180** 0.0949
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0496) (0.0496) (0.1044) (0.0832)
Turnover 0.0051*** 0.0031*** 0.3058*** 0.3058*** 0.2583*** 0.1218
(0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0474) (0.0474) (0.0832) (0.0988)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strength Concern Net CSR No Gov. Man Service
Leverage 0.0122*** 0.0110*** 0.1267 0.1267 0.4831 0.3611
(0.0036) (0.0041) (0.1797) (0.1797) (0.3247) (0.3276)
R&D 0.0074*** 0.0038 0.1624* 0.1624* 0.4268*** 0.0266
(0.0018) (0.0024) (0.0959) (0.0959) (0.1174) (0.1916)
CAPEX 0.0709*** 0.0881*** 0.5026 0.5026 1.0612 0.2891
(0.0149) (0.0186) (0.7604) (0.7604) (2.2124) (1.4779)
Advertising 0.1074*** 0.0535** 3.5444*** 3.5444*** 9.2910*** 0.4299
(0.0267) (0.0247) (1.2096) (1.2096) (2.7413) (2.1168)
ROA 0.0343*** 0.0032 1.3683*** 1.3683*** 2.3127*** 2.0390***
(0.0070) (0.0076) (0.3532) (0.3532) (0.5893) (0.6579)
Wsalesgrowth2 0.0008*** 0.0003* 0.0221*** 0.0221*** 0.0299** 0.0109
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0076) (0.0076) (0.0125) (0.0184)
New England 0.0010 0.0081** 0.1741 0.1741 0.2476 0.2320
Middle Atlantic 0.0086** 0.0019 0.4023** 0.4023** 0.2860 0.7160**
East North Central 0.0084** 0.0032 0.5421*** 0.5421*** 0.4977 0.3683
West North Central 0.0012 0.0014 0.1768 0.1768 0.3724 0.2889
South Atlantic 0.0099*** 0.0032 0.5967*** 0.5967*** 0.6264* 0.6381**
East South Central 0.0130** 0.0089 0.9566*** 0.9566*** 1.6627*** 1.8569***
West South Central 0.0155*** 0.0151*** 1.1732*** 1.1732*** 1.2619*** 1.4476***
Mountain 0.0195*** 0.0067 1.0797*** 1.0797*** 0.4375 0.8357*
_cons 0.0530*** 0.0822*** 0.3359 0.3359 1.2865* 1.1218
(0.0093) (0.0101) (0.3982) (0.3982) (0.7552) (1.1393)
N 14,272 14,272 14,272 14,272 5646 2263
R2 0.264 0.225 0.103 0.103 0.132 0.142
adj. R2 0.262 0.223 0.101 0.101 0.126 0.129
Region_F 5.0041 3.1603 6.0409 6.0409 3.8174 3.7587
Region_p 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0003
Industry Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Cluster S.E (Firm) Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm
This table reports the regression coefﬁcients for the relationship between CSR and ﬁrm Head Quarter location from calendar year 1991 through 2009. We control for year
ﬁxed effects, industry ﬁxed effects, and cluster standard errors at the ﬁrm level. The dependent variable for model (1) is strength, for model (2) is concern, for model (3) is
Net CSR and for Model (4) is No_Gov.We restrict our sample to manufacturing ﬁrms only for model (5) and service ﬁrms only for model (6), using 2-digit SIC codes (see.,
e.g. Jiraporn et al., 2014). We also report the joint test of signiﬁcance for the location dummies. We exclude the standard errors of the location dummies for parsimony.
Panel A reports the regression coefﬁcient results when controlling for ﬁrm headquarters location at the metropolitan statistical area (MSA), Panel B for State Location and
Panel C for U.S Census Bureau Region location. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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in New Hampshire have signiﬁcantly higher levels of strength (0.0752), lower levels of concern (0.0056), and higher levels of Net CSR
(2.8739) than those in California. Alternatively, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Texas have signiﬁcantly
lower levels of CSR relative to California. Firms located in Kentucky have signiﬁcantly lower levels of strength (0.0327), higher levels of
concern (0.0203), and lower levels of CSR (2.6273).
Table 3, Panel C, shows the results when Regional headquarters location is used as the ﬁxed effect. Again, strength, concern, Net CSR,
Net No_Gov are the dependent variables for models (1) through (4), respectively, while Net CSR is the dependent variable in models (5)
and (6) for the manufacturing and service industries, respectively. The results show regional location effects are signiﬁcantly related to
levels of CSR. The joint test of signiﬁcance for the location ﬁxed effect dummies is signiﬁcant at the p< 0.01 or less for all measures of
CSR. Location is associated with ﬁrm level CSR whether we consider strength, concern or Net CSR measures. These results are robust to
concerns around KLD's governance category and are robust to the inclusion of industry level controls as well as restricting our results to
speciﬁc industries with high or low intangible assets.
With the exception of the New England region, most regions tend to have lower levels of CSR relative to the Paciﬁc region (omitted
ﬁxed effect). For example, ﬁrms located in theWest South Central region of the U.S. have signiﬁcantly lower levels of strength (0.0155),
higher levels of concern (0.0151), and lower levels of CSR (1.1732) than those in the Paciﬁc region.
Drawing on this information, it is clear that ﬁrms located in different areas engage CSR at different levels or variances, even over
large geographic areas. These results are robust whether CSR is netted off or considered separately in its constituent parts. The results are
also robust to the inclusion of industry effects even across industries with high or low levels of intangible assets. The latter is particularly
important in the context of Padgett and Galan (2010) as they implicitly state that CSR may be valuable among industries with relatively
higher intangible assets (e.g., manufacturing industries).
4.1. Locale characteristics
4.1.1. Peer effect
Given the evidence that location could inﬂuence or perhaps even drive ﬁrms' CSR decisions, we explore potential impacting factors.
We test whether ﬁrms' CSR proﬁle is affected by the CSR activities of their peers. We specify a pooled OLS model that identiﬁes if a ﬁrm
headquartered in a given MSA is likely to change their CSR engagement in the presence of ﬁrms with extremely high levels (CSR D10) of
CSR (John & Kadyrzhanova, 2008). We also include the average level of CSR in a city (Group_CSR),; speciﬁcally we model:
yit ¼ αþ β01X þ β2CSR D10 þ β3Group CSRit þ δit þ γit þ εi;t (10)
where yit represents the particular CSR variable (either strength, concern, CSR, orNo_Gov), for ﬁrm i, and CSR D10 is the incidence of ﬁrms
in the tenth decile of our CSR measures nationally. Group CSRit is the average level of our CSR measures in a city, is the set of ﬁrm-level
control variables, δit and γit are the year and industry
8
ﬁxed effects, respectively, and εi;t is an error term. In each model, we cluster
standard errors at the ﬁrm level to account for within-ﬁrm correlation over time.
Table 4, models (1) and (2) present the results with strength and concern as the dependent variables, respectively. We also include Net
CSR and No_Gov as dependent variables in models (3) and (4). For continued robustness against the impact of industry and the prev-
alence of intangible assets, we restrict our sample for each industry. We include the results for the manufacturing and service industries
in models (5) and (6), respectively.
We see in Table 4, Panel A, that the joint test of signiﬁcance for the peer effect variables are signiﬁcant at p< 0.01 or less for all
measures of CSR. Taking a closer look, the presence of ﬁrms with high levels of CSR (CSR D10Þ within an MSA appears not to affect the
level of any of our CSR measures. Our results suggest that ﬁrms with extreme levels of CSR do not seem to signiﬁcantly alter the level of
CSR behavior of other ﬁrms within their community. Next, we examine the impact of the average level of CSR (Group_CSR) within an
MSA on a ﬁrm's level of CSR. The results suggest that the average level of peer CSR could inform a ﬁrm's CSR decisions. Our results show
a signiﬁcant correlation between the average level of CSR within a MSA location and the level of a ﬁrm's CSR. All three measures of CSR
(strength, concern, and CSR) in models (1) through (3) are signiﬁcantly correlated (0.8535, 0.7271, and 0.9182, respectively) with
Group_CSR signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Our results are robust to the exclusion of the governance category when calculating CSR (model (4)) or the inclusion of industry
controls, and are highly signiﬁcant when considering each industry separately (models (5) and (6)). These results allow us to posit that
ﬁrms might adjust their CSR in an effort to mimic the CSR of their peers or, alternatively, respond to inherent cultural and legal factors
present in their community. The exact socio-demographic factors within an MSA might induce certain types of responsible or irre-
sponsible behavior. Our results would suggest that the conformity of CSR proﬁles within locations are materially associated with the
CSR proﬁles of other ﬁrms within an area. This is also consistent with the view that CSR is costly and ﬁrms have the tendency to stick to
CSR practice within their area due to facilitation of the ﬂow of information, values, and norms (e.g., advantages from proximity as
suggested by Oliver (1991). However, further consideration has to be given to other factors that might induce these results beyond ﬁrms
mimicking each other's CSR proﬁle.
4.1.2. Socio-economic indicators
To shed further light on the local factors that might induce certain CSR activities within a community, we specify a pooled OLSmodel
8 2 digit SIC code.
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Table 4
Demographics and CSR.
Panel A: Peer effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strength Concern Net CSR No Gov. Man Service
Cash Ratio 0.0308*** 0.0266*** 0.5901** 0.8212*** 0.7483** 1.2639***
(0.0043) (0.0049) (0.2323) (3.77) (0.3770) (0.4836)
Size 0.0150*** 0.0183*** 0.0878* 0.2880*** 0.1981** 0.0601
(0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0482) (6.28) (0.0984) (0.0846)
Turnover 0.0056*** 0.0002 0.2326*** 0.1132*** 0.2277*** 0.1065
(0.0009) (0.0011) (0.0455) (-2.68) (0.0742) (0.0960)
Leverage 0.0078*** 0.0034 0.2329 0.3133** 0.4384 0.4690
(0.0028) (0.0036) (0.1668) (-1.96) (0.2927) (0.3238)
R&D 0.0027* 0.0014 0.1642** 0.2206*** 0.3811*** 0.0504
(0.0015) (0.0020) (0.0816) (2.85) (0.1051) (0.1929)
CAPEX 0.0651*** 0.0009 2.5204*** 2.3615*** 0.5220 0.2244
(0.0148) (0.0221) (0.9455) (2.59) (2.0258) (1.6532)
Advertising 0.0798*** 0.0139 3.3466*** 3.6016*** 9.1197*** 0.1824
(0.0239) (0.0229) (1.1778) (3.24) (2.5610) (1.8639)
ROA 0.0166*** 0.0115 1.1262*** 1.3058*** 2.1632*** 2.2143***
(0.0061) (0.0071) (0.3204) (4.20) (0.5674) (0.6443)
Sales Growth 0.0006*** 0.0003 0.0170** 0.0289*** 0.0178 0.0064
(0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0078) (-3.81) (0.0134) (0.0204)
CSR D10 0.0116 0.0033 0.0432 0.2804 0.3514 1.6336
(0.0135) (0.0145) (0.4910) (0.59) (0.7415) (1.1348)
Group_CSR. 0.8535*** 0.7271*** 0.9182*** 0.8838*** 1.1499*** 0.4253**
(0.0961) (0.0684) (0.0732) (12.50) (0.1238) (0.1809)
Intercept 0.1068*** 0.1199*** 0.9907** 2.4558*** 2.4921*** 2.3540**
(0.0107) (0.0109) (0.4132) (-6.12) (0.8028) (1.0370)
N 14,629 14,629 14,639 14,639 5614 2310
R2 0.3238 0.3013 0.1697 0.202 0.1933 0.1110
adj. R2 0.3220 0.2995 0.1675 0.200 0.1891 0.0996
F 13.2715 22.9117 18.2447 16.89 10.5835 3.4331
p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Peer_F 65.5388 77.5086 96.8966 98.7683 52.1937 9.2201
Peer_p 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered S.E. (Firm) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel B: Clientele Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strength Concern Net CSR No Gov. Man Service
Cash Ratio 0.0283*** 0.0266*** 0.594*** 0.802*** 0.759** 1.463***
(6.61) (5.52) (2.60) (0.215) (2.04) (3.21)
Size 0.0141*** 0.0189*** 0.0323 0.233*** 0.102 0.0548
(13.85) (15.89) (0.70) (0.044) (1.10) (0.64)
Turnover 0.0063*** 0.00050 0.260*** 0.139*** 0.267*** 0.169*
(-7.41) (0.48) (-5.77) (0.042) (-3.42) (-1.74)
Leverage 0.0051* 0.00392 0.123 0.198 0.391 0.421
(-1.84) (-1.17) (-0.79) (0.147) (-1.45) (-1.39)
R&D 0.00224 0.00233 0.179** 0.240*** 0.458*** 0.0120
(1.58) (-1.22) (2.23) (0.076) (4.45) (0.06)
CAPEX 0.0684*** 0.00957 2.300*** 2.206*** 0.948 0.173
(4.50) (0.51) (2.65) (0.836) (0.46) (-0.12)
Advertising 0.0878*** 0.0178 3.855*** 4.032*** 9.715*** 0.617
(3.57) (0.78) (3.20) (1.130) (4.00) (0.33)
ROA 0.0193*** 0.0141** 1.357*** 1.608*** 2.741*** 2.283***
(3.10) (-2.05) (4.25) (0.307) (4.93) (3.53)
Sales Growth 0.0007*** 0.000163 0.0253*** 0.035*** 0.0316*** 0.00466
(-5.64) (-0.97) (-3.68) (0.007) (-2.74) (-0.24)
Education 0.0007*** 0.0004 0.0462*** 0.048*** 0.0432** 0.0438**
(3.01) (-1.64) (3.92) (0.011) (2.14) (2.12)
Wealth 0.00001** 0.000001* 0.00003** 0.000* 0.00005* 0.00004*
(-2.01) (1.89) (-2.42) (0.000) (-1.81) (-1.74)
Sophistication 0.000002* 0.00000** 0.00008** 0.0000** 0.00017** 0.000101
(1.78) (-2.11) (2.49) (0.000) (2.09) (1.61)
Intercept 0.0639*** 0.0887*** 0.752* 2.465*** 1.594* 2.317*
(-6.78) (-9.11) (-1.77) (0.413) (-1.90) (-1.93)
(continued on next page)
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Table 4 (continued )
Panel B: Clientele Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strength Concern Net CSR No Gov. Man Service
N 17,885 17,885 17,885 17,885 7025 2520
R2 0.265 0.266 0.112 0.140 0.110 0.0922
adj. R2 0.263 0.265 0.110 0.138 0.106 0.0812
F 12.66 22.27 15.55 13.462 8.650 3.436
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Clientelle_F 6.31 2.51 10.83 15.52 4.59 2.70
Clientelle_p 0.000 0.054 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.045
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered S.E (Firm) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C: Culture Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strength Concern Net CSR No Gov. Man Service
Cash Ratio 0.0319*** 0.0261*** 0.819*** 1.109*** 0.998*** 1.448***
(7.64) (5.45) (3.66) (0.210) (2.80) (3.20)
Size 0.0141*** 0.0190*** 0.0340 0.242*** 0.0972 0.0489
(13.50) (16.08) (0.72) (0.045) (1.03) (0.60)
Turnover 0.0062*** 0.00051 0.248*** 0.121*** 0.253*** 0.158*
(-7.31) (0.50) (-5.61) (0.042) (-3.29) (-1.71)
Leverage 0.00538* 0.00412 0.138 0.229 0.423 0.359
(-1.94) (-1.24) (-0.90) (0.148) (-1.56) (-1.19)
R&D 0.00260* 0.00251 0.205** 0.272*** 0.506*** 0.00802
(1.82) (-1.30) (2.48) (0.078) (4.65) (0.05)
CAPEX 0.0669*** 0.00954 2.201** 2.045** 0.608 0.216
(4.46) (0.52) (2.57) (0.827) (0.29) (0.15)
Advertising 0.0916*** 0.0151 4.158*** 4.416*** 10.11*** 0.234
(3.73) (0.67) (3.46) (1.131) (4.19) (-0.12)
ROA 0.0198*** 0.0147** 1.398*** 1.641*** 2.825*** 2.184***
(3.18) (-2.12) (4.31) (0.313) (5.05) (3.42)
Sales Growth 0.0007*** 0.000172 0.0244*** 0.034*** 0.0333*** 0.00449
(-5.61) (-1.03) (-3.55) (0.007) (-2.86) (-0.24)
Protestant 0.0261 0.0232 2.134** 2.258*** 1.740 0.541
(-1.62) (1.46) (-2.47) (0.833) (-1.01) (-0.45)
Trust 0.0242 0.0270 1.992 2.385 6.335** 8.945***
(0.85) (-0.86) (1.31) (1.508) (2.20) (3.19)
Intercept 0.0534*** 0.0906*** 0.0333 1.662** 2.590 4.471**
(-3.38) (-5.07) (-0.04) (0.833) (-1.52) (-2.57)
N 18,035 18,035 18,035 18,035 7082 2527
R2 0.260 0.266 0.105 0.128 0.105 0.107
adj. R2 0.258 0.265 0.103 0.126 0.101 0.0962
F 12.72 22.81 16.29 13.602 9.088 3.860
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Culture_F 4.121 2.851 9.399 11.820 8.060 8.062
Culture_p 0.010 0.048 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered S.E (Firm) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel D: Goodwill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strength Concern Net CSR No Gov. Man Service
Cash Ratio 0.0339*** 0.0251*** 0.948*** 1.193*** 1.281*** 1.576***
(8.05) (5.22) (4.15) (0.211) (3.45) (3.11)
Size 0.0152*** 0.0177*** 0.101** 0.301*** 0.202** 0.128
(14.67) (15.54) (2.16) (0.044) (2.11) (1.49)
Turnover 0.0056*** 0.000135 0.233*** 0.084** 0.217*** 0.163
(-6.73) (0.13) (-5.15) (0.042) (-2.77) (-1.64)
Leverage 0.00574** 0.00404 0.158 0.239* 0.345 0.497
(-2.18) (-1.27) (-1.06) (0.142) (-1.29) (-1.51)
R&D 0.00168 0.00159 0.114 0.162** 0.438*** 0.0630
(1.18) (-0.85) (1.35) (0.080) (3.91) (-0.31)
(continued on next page)
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Table 4 (continued )
Panel D: Goodwill
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strength Concern Net CSR No Gov. Man Service
CAPEX 0.0560*** 0.0232 1.538* 1.449* 0.464 0.627
(4.11) (1.28) (1.89) (0.782) (-0.23) (-0.44)
Advertising 0.0821*** 0.0126 3.690*** 3.845*** 9.827*** 0.498
(3.47) (0.58) (3.08) (1.107) (3.61) (0.25)
ROA 0.0150** 0.0109 0.990*** 1.124*** 2.318*** 2.108***
(2.58) (-1.61) (3.18) (0.296) (4.25) (3.10)
Sales Growth 0.0008*** 0.000024 0.0257** 0.035*** 0.0317* 0.00783
(-4.50) (-0.09) (-2.49) (0.009) (-1.65) (0.27)
# Charities 14.53*** 11.70*** 1020.0*** 867.848*** 1727.3*** 1406.3***
(2.58) (-3.53) (3.79) (247.311) (2.88) (4.44)
Char.Rev./Pop. 166.9 35.25 9524.0* 7875.27* 23102* 22728***
(-1.61) (0.45) (-1.84) (4618.83) (-1.88) (-3.12)
Revenue per Charity 0.155** 0.0925 10.52*** 12.617*** 12.38** 26.65***
(2.46) (-1.59) (3.31) (2.948) (2.03) (4.42)
Giving 0.0315 0.298 4.040 4.618 15.65 40.91*
(0.17) (1.38) (-0.39) (10.145) (-0.75) (-1.68)
Intercept 0.0640*** 0.0675*** 0.681* 2.094*** 1.485* 1.499
(-7.31) (-7.86) (-1.80) (0.354) (-1.70) (-1.45)
N 13,720 13,720 13,720 13,720 5071 2081
R2 0.261 0.258 0.0913 0.119 0.0968 0.104
adj. R2 0.259 0.256 0.0893 0.117 0.0930 0.0945
F 14.85 19.84 13.87 14.777 8.023 4.272
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Goodwill_F 2.500 7.313 6.548 8.107 2.879 7.653
Goodwill_p 0.041 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.000
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered S.E (Firm) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel E:Tax Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strength Concern Net CSR No Gov. Man Service
Cash Ratio 0.0338*** 0.0255*** 0.984*** 1.297*** 1.266*** 1.788***
(8.00) (5.32) (4.36) (0.211) (3.50) (3.83)
Size 0.0145*** 0.0189*** 0.0535 0.268*** 0.133 0.0828
(13.86) (15.78) (1.12) (0.045) (1.36) (0.96)
Turnover 0.0059*** 0.000112 0.230*** 0.093** 0.197** 0.191*
(-7.27) (0.10) (-5.14) (0.042) (-2.53) (-1.96)
Leverage 0.00567** 0.00415 0.164 0.263* 0.441 0.491
(-2.06) (-1.24) (-1.06) (0.149) (-1.57) (-1.54)
R&D 0.00201 0.00207 0.159** 0.220*** 0.434*** 0.0169
(1.46) (-1.09) (1.99) (0.076) (4.32) (-0.09)
CAPEX 0.0624*** 0.0125 2.093** 1.933** 0.863 0.493
(4.26) (0.68) (2.47) (0.813) (0.39) (-0.36)
Advertising 0.0872*** 0.0186 3.930*** 4.250*** 9.746*** 0.462
(3.57) (0.83) (3.23) (1.151) (3.64) (0.24)
ROA 0.0160*** 0.0124* 1.137*** 1.342*** 2.499*** 1.903***
(2.65) (-1.83) (3.59) (0.304) (4.51) (3.02)
Sales Growth 0.0009*** 0.000298 0.0258*** 0.035*** 0.0364*** 0.00300
(-6.41) (-1.60) (-3.43) (0.007) (-2.68) (-0.15)
Tax Burden 0.00485** 0.00764*** 0.489*** 0.536*** 0.822*** 0.580**
(-2.16) (2.74) (-3.86) (0.117) (-3.04) (-2.06)
Intercept 0.0452*** 0.0896*** 0.666* 0.758** 0.159 0.0453
(-5.70) (-9.85) (1.76) (0.355) (0.20) (-0.05)
N 16,566 16,566 16,566 16,566 6233 2440
R2 0.257 0.265 0.0902 0.119 0.0885 0.0772
adj. R2 0.256 0.263 0.0885 0.117 0.0853 0.0688
F 13.99 24.97 16.11 14.470 9.143 3.438
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tax_F 4.653 7.522 14.92 20.959 9.240 4.223
Tax_p 0.0311 0.0061 0.0001 0.000 0.0024 0.0404
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered S.E (Firm) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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that identiﬁes whether a ﬁrm headquartered in a given area is likely to alter their CSR engagement in the presence of a number of local
socio-economic characteristics that could potentially explain the geographic effect present in our study. This is largely motivated by the
clientele based explanation for the clustering of CSR activities among locals. In a cross-country setting, Dam and Scholtens (2008) show
that multinational ﬁrms with poor environmental standards are more likely to operate in countries that are poor, corrupt, and loose in
environmental regulations. Within the context of the ‘Pollution Haven Hypothesis,’multinational ﬁrms with dirty operations choose to
operate in such an environment and the opposite is true for multinational ﬁrms with a strong CSR. In other words, demographic and
socio-economic factors within a country formulate regulations and social attitudes toward CSR and these, in turn, can affect the CSR
aggregate of culture/norm within the country. We extend this concept in the context of geography within a large country as in the U.S.
Speciﬁcally,
yit ¼ αþ β01X þ β
0
2Y þ δit þ γit þ εi;t (11)
where is a vector of variables controlling for different characteristics of the local area. Speciﬁcally, for Table 4, Panel B (Clientele),
represents Education,Wealth, and Sophistication; for Panel C (Culture), represents Protestant and Trust; for Panel D (Goodwill), represents
#Charities, Char.Rev/Pop., Rev./#Char., and Giving; for Panel E (Tax), represents Tax Burden; and for Panel F (Crime), represents Fraud,
Regulatory, Tax, and Environmental.
Table 4, Panel B (Clientele) shows the results of the impact of potential clienteles within a community, where all three clientele
variables are designated at the MSA level and document the impact education, wealth, and sophistication (investment income) might
Panel F: Crime Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Strength Concern Net CSR No Gov. Man Service
Cash Ratio 0.0346*** 0.0255*** 1.015*** 1.320*** 1.301*** 1.772***
(8.19) (5.32) (4.51) (0.210) (3.59) (3.89)
Size 0.0146*** 0.0189*** 0.0585 0.272*** 0.139 0.0839
(14.10) (15.77) (1.23) (0.045) (1.42) (0.99)
Turnover 0.00591*** 0.0000387 0.226*** 0.087** 0.193** 0.187*
(-7.31) (-0.04) (-5.03) (0.042) (-2.43) (-1.91)
Leverage 0.00596** 0.00398 0.183 0.280* 0.453 0.473
(-2.18) (-1.19) (-1.18) (0.148) (-1.64) (-1.49)
R&D 0.00195 0.00183 0.150* 0.210*** 0.425*** 0.0144
(1.41) (-0.95) (1.81) (0.078) (4.08) (-0.08)
CAPEX 0.0595*** 0.0135 1.945** 1.736** 0.917 1.013
(4.09) (0.72) (2.29) (0.812) (0.42) (-0.75)
Advertising 0.0900*** 0.0138 4.147*** 4.453*** 10.45*** 0.607
(3.68) (0.62) (3.39) (1.159) (3.79) (0.31)
ROA 0.0152** 0.0120* 1.090*** 1.284*** 2.424*** 1.958***
(2.53) (-1.78) (3.44) (0.305) (4.37) (3.13)
Sales Growth 0.0009*** 0.000302 0.0241*** 0.033*** 0.0353*** 0.00264
(-6.18) (-1.61) (-3.21) (0.007) (-2.59) (0.14)
Fraud 0.0495 0.259*** 8.451*** 7.067** 12.61** 11.18*
(-0.87) (4.17) (-2.78) (2.922) (-1.98) (-1.81)
Regulatory offenses 0.815*** 0.582*** 47.79*** 41.299*** 57.49*** 14.33
(3.14) (-2.67) (3.67) (13.476) (2.82) (0.80)
Tax Crime 0.792 1.205 70.40* 75.123** 0.526 9.593
(1.10) (-1.16) (1.89) (35.596) (0.01) (-0.14)
Environmental offenses 1.777* 0.676 36.47 0.892 85.24 5.019
(1.96) (0.71) (0.74) (47.775) (-0.72) (-0.04)
Intercept 0.0530*** 0.0869*** 0.190 1.289*** 0.242 0.0343
(-6.09) (-9.21) (0.49) (0.372) (-0.32) (0.04)
N 16,258 16,258 16,258 16,258 6068 2417
R2 0.259 0.267 0.0876 0.114 0.0826 0.0754
adj. R2 0.258 0.265 0.0857 0.113 0.0789 0.0662
F 13.61 23.79 14.97 13.130 8.726 3.109
p 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Crime_F 3.598 5.272 5.462 4.349 5.386 0.931
Crime_p 0.006 0.0003 0.0002 0.002 0.0003 0.445
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered S.E (Firm) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the regression coefﬁcients for the relationship between CSR socio-demographic indicators from calendar year 1991 through 2009. We control for year
ﬁxed effects, industry ﬁxed effects, and cluster standard errors at the ﬁrm level. The dependent variables are strength for model (1), concern for model (2), Net CSR for
models (3), (5), and (6), and our non-governance net CSR measure: No_Gov. for model (4). We restrict our sample to manufacturing ﬁrms only for model (5) and service
ﬁrms only for model (6), using 2-digit SIC codes (see., e.g. Jiraporn et al., 2014). We also report the joint test of signiﬁcance for the socio-demographic variables. Panel A,
shows the results for our Peer effect variables; Panel B, shows the results for our Clientele effect variables; Panel C, shows the results for our Culture effect variables; Panel
D, shows the result for our Goodwill variables; Panel E shows the results for our Tax effect variables; and ﬁnally Panel F. shows the results of our Crime variables. *, **, ***
indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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have on the level of CSR. Firstly, the F-test for joint signiﬁcance rejects the null hypothesis for all models, indicating at least one of the
variables has a signiﬁcant impact on CSR. The evidence suggests that communities that are more educated are associated with ﬁrms that
engage in higher levels of responsible behavior (model (1)). This result is also supported by the net CSR measures in models (3)–(6). It
would seem ﬁrms engage in more responsible behavior in communities with higher education (Education), regardless of the industry.
Surprisingly, wealthier communities (Wealth) tend to associate with ﬁrms with lower levels of CSR. These results are signiﬁcant across
all our model speciﬁcations. Lastly, more ﬁnancially sophisticated communities (Sophistication) with larger amounts of investment
income, are signiﬁcantly associated with greater levels of CSR, the only exception being ﬁrms in the service industry. Given investors'
preference for local ﬁrms, our results suggest that communities where local investors are better educated and have greater access to
investment funds tend to house ﬁrms that engage in more responsible behavior and less irresponsible behavior. Perhaps, in areas where
local investors represent a signiﬁcant portion of ﬁrm ﬁnancing, ﬁrms are more sensitive to the impact they might have on the local
community. However, wealthier communities do not share this phenomenon, perhaps because wealthier individuals are able to insulate
themselves from negative phenomena in their environment. Our ﬁndings add to the limited literature that emphasizes the impact of
socio-economic factors on CSR activities. For example, studying 520 ﬁnancial ﬁrms in 34 countries during the 2003–2005 period, Chih
et al. (2010) ﬁnd that sample ﬁrms are more socially responsible in countries with a better macroeconomic environment, higher quality
management schools, and a more cooperative employer-employee relationship.
Panel C (Culture) of Table 4 documents the impact of local culture on the level of CSR within a community. Both Protestant and Trust
are designated at the regional level. Although not all coefﬁcients are signiﬁcant in all model speciﬁcations, the F-test for joint signif-
icance rejects the null hypothesis for all models, indicating that at least the sum of the variables have a signiﬁcant association with CSR.
The joint signiﬁcance is consistent with the literature. Furthermore, if we control for location, the results become evenmore signiﬁcant.9
Model (3) of Panel C shows that ﬁrms located in communities with a more Protestant culture, one where individuals take more personal
responsibility, are signiﬁcantly associated with less CSR (2.134 at 5% signiﬁcance). Conversely, our results tangentially show that
communities which are inherently trustworthy are more likely to associate with higher levels of CSR.
The link between charities and corporate behavior is documented. Card et al. (2010) show that charities are able to extract more
donations from ﬁrms that are resident within their community. Whether ﬁrms increase donations to local charities due to lobbying, the
threat of activism, or to the perquisite beneﬁts management extract from being agents of the benefactor, is unclear. However, along with
Marquis et al. (2007), it is apparent that the presence of charities within a community can have a notable impact on the behavior of
managers and their ﬁrms. Panel D (Goodwill) of Table 4 includes four variables to account for charitable actions within each MSA. We
control for the number of charities in the community (#Charities), the ability of those charities to extract donations from the resident
population (Char.Rev/Pop), the size of the charities (Revenue per Charity), and the generosity of the community (Giving). It is evident that
the number of charities has a profound impact on the CSR behavior that ﬁrms exhibit. Charities seem to increase the level of responsible
behavior within a community, while also decreasing the level of irresponsible behavior at the same time. This result is signiﬁcant at the
1% level for all models, and robust to different CSR measures and industry speciﬁcations. Furthermore, larger charities tend to also
associate with communities with higher levels of CSR, with all results signiﬁcant at the 5% level or less. Whether charities and high CSR
ﬁrms are drawn to the same communities, or whether charities truly affect CSR, is unclear, but it is obvious that an association exists.
However, the charitability of the community (Giving) and the efﬁciency of the charities (Char.Rev/Pop) are less important, with the F-test
for joint signiﬁcance of the goodwill variables rejecting the null hypothesis for all models.
Next, we consider the taxation policies of individual communities. Steven Pinker (1996) makes a convincing argument linking our
propensity for the common good, altruistic behavior, and our political beliefs. Brieﬂy, the value we place on an egalitarian society and
the public good could manifest in the taxation policies we implement. Table 4, Panel E, shows the results when we include the tax
regressivity of state and local taxes (Tax Burden). The results suggest that, as the tax burden becomes more regressive, a greater tax
burden in placed on the lower socio-economic class, and the level of responsible behavior of ﬁrms goes down. The level of irresponsible
behavior in communities exhibited by ﬁrms, however, is positively related to tax regressivity. These results are also present when
considering net levels of CSR and different industries. It would appear that in communities where the wealthy are able to reduce their tax
burden at the expense of the poor, ﬁrms would engage in less CSR. Individuals in lower socio-economic circumstances bearing a greater
share of the tax burden might be indicative of communities unwilling or unable to constrain the behavior of the wealthier and more
powerful members of the community.
Lastly, Herrmann, Th€oni, and G€achter (2008) provide evidence that societies, where laws are respected and violence is ceded to the
government, are more likely to have a propensity toward the common good. In line with this research, and following Case and Katz
(1991), we include, as shown in Panel F, crime data at the state level documenting prosecutions (not convictions) for non-violent crimes
that relate most to trust and respect of the environment and the legal system. Firstly, the joint test of signiﬁcance for the crime variables
are signiﬁcant at p< 0.01 or less for all models except model (6). Turning to individual variables, it becomes clear that fraud and
regulatory offenses have the most signiﬁcant association with the level of CSR. It is important to note that we consider cases prosecuted,
not whether those cases where convicted. As with all crime studies and data, one has to be careful to infer causation. One cannot
absolutely differentiate between communities where more crimes are perpetrated compared to communities that are more likely to
prosecute crime. We will thus refrain from discussing any causative relationships, but assert that crime and a community's propensity to
prosecute is signiﬁcantly associated with CSR. We believe that our results support the conjecture that, as a society's desire to maintain
the common and public good increases, its tolerance of corporate behavior that comes at the expense of the public good would decrease.
9 Results not reported for reasons of parsimony.
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4.2. Impact of geography and CSR on Tobin's Q
The ﬁnancial impact of geography on CSR is examined next. We focus on the ﬁrm value (rather than cost of equity as in Husted et al.
(2016)). Gregory, Tharyan, and Whittaker (2014) closely examine the beneﬁt of CSR and conclude that the positive valuation effect
primarily arises from improved future growth prospects (rather than reduced risk, e.g., lower cost of equity) of CSR-active ﬁrms.
Building on this, we aim to better understand the value impact of clustering or diversifying along a CSR continuumwithin a locality. Our
previous results indicate heterogeneity around means and variances of CSR across MSAs. Moreover, we ﬁnd that ﬁrms tend to adjust
their level of CSR in accordance with other local ﬁrms. However, is there a ﬁnancial beneﬁt to mimicking peers' CSR levels? Does
clustering or diversifying along a CSR continuum in a locale offer any ﬁnancial beneﬁts?
We specify a pooled OLS model that identiﬁes whether a ﬁrm's value is affected by the deviation from the group mean within a
locality:
yit ¼ αþ β01X þ β2Deviationit þ δit þ γit þ εi;t (12)
where yit represents the value measure for ﬁrm i, and
Deviationit ¼

1þ CSRit  GroupCSRit 2 (13)
where Deviation is a vector of the difference between the set of Group CSRit (from equation (7)) and the actual CSR of ﬁrm i at time t
(CSRit). Again, Group CSRit is the average level of CSR in an MSA, not including the score of ﬁrm i.
Table 5 presents the results of equation (13).10 We see in model (1) that the effect of deviating from the group average for strength is
signiﬁcant and negative (8.401 at 1% signiﬁcance). Firms that deviate from the mean CSR within a locality are associated with a
decrease in value. Speciﬁcally, a one standard deviation increase or decrease in the level of strength, beyond the MSA average, is
Table 5
Effect of geography on Tobin's Q.
(1) (2) (3)
Tobin's Q Tobin's Q Lagged Tobin's Q
Size 1.006*** 1.004*** 0.776***
(0.101) (0.101) (0.088)
Turnover 0.357*** 0.356*** 0.061**
(0.039) (0.039) (0.030)
Leverage 0.072 0.061 0.204
(0.217) (0.216) (0.153)
R&D 0.445*** 0.446*** 0.530***
(0.134) (0.134) (0.171)
Capex 0.911 0.946* 0.080
(0.559) (0.557) (0.507)
Advertising 2.311 2.207 0.130
(1.789) (1.799) (1.268)
ROA 3.244*** 3.254*** 1.783***
(0.322) (0.322) (0.380)
Sales growth 0.011 0.011 0.005
(0.007) (0.008) (0.005)
Deviation Strength 8.401*** – –
(3.003)
Deviation Concern 0.613 – –
(1.872)
Deviation Net CSR – 0.005** 0.004**
(0.002) (0.002)
Intercept 8.354*** 8.355*** 6.841***
(0.684) (0.686) (0.604)
N 14,193 14,193 11,503
R2 0.228 0.227 0.189
Adj. R2 0.226 0.225 0.187
F 34.941 36.119 28.892
p 0.000 0.000 0.000
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the regression coefﬁcients for the relationship between CSR and deviating from the CSR norm within an MSA from calendar year 1991
through 2009. We control for year ﬁxed effects, industry ﬁxed effects, and ﬁrm level ﬁxed effects. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
10 We also performed sub-sample analyses before and after 2003, with our results remaining qualitatively similar.
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associated with a 21% percent decrease in Tobin's Q at 1% signiﬁcance. The differences in CSR quality within each MSA between ﬁrms
could translate to considerable effects on value. Furthermore, the average level of strength varies greatly across cities, with Minneapolis-
St. Paul having twice the strength than Houston or Atlanta. Conversely, Houston has twice the level of concern than Washington D.C. In
model (2), we consider the impact of deviating from Net CSR. The results continue to support the notion that ﬁrms that deviate from the
average level of CSR within a locale are associated with decreased value. Speciﬁcally, a one standard deviation increase or decrease in
the level of Net CSR, beyond the MSA average, is associated with a 2.8% percent decrease in Tobin's Q at 1% signiﬁcance. These results
establish the economic signiﬁcance of the geography of CSR.
Finally, we lag all the independent variables in model (3) to mitigate some endogeneity concerns. Again, our results are robust to this
treatment. Building on our results thus far, it seems that ﬁrms that do not conform to a community's CSR expectation risk being penalized
ﬁnancially. The exact process is unknown but we posit that if investors have a signiﬁcant preference for local ﬁrms, and if investment
decisions are inﬂuenced by socio-demographics within a community, then ﬁrms that do not target their CSR proﬁle toward their local
community of investors could face ﬁnancial penalties.
4.3. CSR instruments
The relationship between ﬁrm performance and CSR is fraught with endogeneity issues. It is difﬁcult to determine if better per-
formance allows ﬁrms to engage in CSR or if CSR impacts ﬁrm performance. An appropriate exogenous CSR proxy would help to
alleviate some of the endogeneity concerns. Flammer (2015) uses “close call” proposals as a casual estimate of the CSR-CFP (Corporate
Financial Performance) relationship. Secondly, Jiraporn et al. (2013) show a signiﬁcant CSR correlation between surrounding ﬁrms and,
as a result, use zip codes as an exogenous proxy to evaluate CSR's impact on credit ratings. Our results thus far have indicated that the
CSR proﬁles of ﬁrms are signiﬁcantly associated with the socio-economic environment in which a ﬁrm is headquartered. The results
Table 6
Two-stage least squared analysis of the effect of CSR on ﬁrm value.
MSA State Region
1st Stage (1) 1st Stage (2) 1st Stage (3)
Net CSR Tobin's Q Net CSR Tobin's Q Net CSR Tobin's Q
Cash Ratio 0.081*** 0.245*** 0.086*** 0.254*** 0.083*** 0.435***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.162)
Size 0.229*** 0.256*** 0.227*** 0.281*** 0.219*** 0.757*
(0.021) (0.030) (0.021) (0.035) (0.021) (0.423)
Turnover 0.525*** 0.269* 0.524*** 0.335** 0.561*** 1.599
(0.100) (0.155) (0.100) (0.164) (0.100) (1.143)
Leverage 0.377*** 1.179*** 0.385*** 1.133*** 0.399*** 0.249
(0.045) (0.088) (0.045) (0.095) (0.045) (0.789)
R&D 1.946*** 0.836* 1.872*** 0.624 1.806*** 3.424
(0.435) (0.455) (0.433) (0.512) (0.432) (3.725)
CAPEX 4.002*** 1.200 4.193*** 0.704 4.273*** 8.737
(0.598) (0.965) (0.609) (1.064) (0.609) (8.509)
Advertising 1.152*** 4.299*** 1.177*** 4.167*** 1.151*** 1.656
(0.180) (0.280) (0.181) (0.302) (0.181) (2.289)
ROA 0.019** 0.036*** 0.019** 0.038*** 0.018** 0.078*
(0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.042)
Net CSR 0.565*** 0.681*** 2.887
(0.101) (0.135) (1.957)
MSA 0.000***
(0.000)
State 0.008***
(0.001)
Region 0.010
(0.007)
Intercept 0.448* 2.946*** 0.190 2.943*** 0.032 2.879***
(0.239) (0.172) (0.230) (0.192) (0.238) (0.679)
Observations 14,272 14,272 14,272 14,272 14,272 14,272
R2 0.103 0.172 0.102 0.391 0.099 13.027
Adjusted R2 0.101 0.175 0.099 0.394 0.096 13.063
F 45.478 56.532 44.738 48.906 43.605 8.046
p 0.000 . 0.000 . 0.000 .
HansenJ_F – – –
HansenJ_p
Industry Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
This table reports the coefﬁcients for the two-stage least squared regression analyzing the relationship between CSR and Tobin's Q from calendar year 1991 through 2009.
In model (1), we instrument Net CSR with ﬁrm MSA headquarter location. In model (2), we instrument Net CSR with ﬁrm State headquarter location. In model (3), we
instrument Net CSR with ﬁrm U.S Census Bureau Region headquarter location. We control for year ﬁxed effects, industry ﬁxed effects. *, **, *** indicate signiﬁcance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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suggest that zip codes could simply be a proxy for these indicators. Our results have also shown that the location effect could be in
signiﬁcantly large areas, such as in census bureau regions. We test to see if alternative location instruments exist to proxy for CSR.
Speciﬁcally, equation (14) takes the following form:
yit ¼ αþ β01X þ β2CSR Instrumentit þ δit þ γit þ εi;t (14)
where yit represents the value measure for ﬁrm i, and CSR Instrumentit is derived in equation (15):
yit ¼ αþ β01X þ β2Locationþ δit þ γit þ εi;t (15)
where yit represents the CSR variable for ﬁrm i. Location indicates the location of the ﬁrm (either MSA, State, or Census Region).
The results of equations (14) and (15) are presented in Table 6. Model (1) contains the results from equation (15) where MSA
location is used as the instrument. Our results indicate that, using MSA to instrument for Net CSR, CSR is positively and signiﬁcantly
related to Tobin's Q at the 1% level. As the instruments are exactly identiﬁed, the Hansen J test is omitted. Next, we instrument Net CSR
with the location State of the ﬁrms. The results, reported in model (2), show a positive and signiﬁcant association between CSR and ﬁrm
value at the 1% level. Lastly, we use the geographical region that a ﬁrm is located as an instrument for Net CSR. The results indicate that
regional location is not signiﬁcantly correlated with CSR and that the second stage regression does not produce a signiﬁcant result.
Importantly, the results show that location, even at the city or state level, is signiﬁcantly associated with ﬁrm value and future studies
could employ location, even at the state level, to proxy for CSR. This would be very convenient for researchers. In fact, a ﬁrm changing its
headquarter address within a city or state would not signiﬁcantly affect the viability of these proxies.
5. Conclusion
In this study, we posit that a ﬁrm's headquarter location is indicative of the socio-economic factors that affect a ﬁrm's CSR proﬁle. The
results offer strong evidence that location has a signiﬁcant effect on the CSR proﬁle of resident ﬁrms. We ﬁnd that ﬁrms' CSR levels not
only vary signiﬁcantly across geography, but that each metropolitan statistical area (MSA) is signiﬁcantly associated with a resident
ﬁrm's level of CSR. Houston has a strength standard deviation half that of San Jose, while San Jose has a concern standard deviation half
that of Dallas-Fort Worth. We ﬁnd that location has a signiﬁcant impact on the level of a ﬁrm's strength and concern, although the effect
is more pronounced for strength than concern.
We document that the economic, legal, regulatory, and charitable demographic differences across geography explain some of the
variation in CSRmeans betweenmetropolitan statistical areas where charitable behavior is the most signiﬁcant. Our results indicate that
Tobin's Q is affected by ﬁrms clustering along a CSR continuum within their locale. The economic impact of this CSR clustering tends to
be positive, with ﬁrms experiencing increases in value as they move toward the locale mean. More importantly, we document the impact
of culture on CSR and show that better educated and sophisticated societies with a propensity for the common good and a low tolerance
of illegal behavior are likely to have resident ﬁrms with higher levels of strength behavior and lower levels of concern behavior.
Lastly, we use knowledge of the local socio-economic indicators as exogenous proxies for CSR. Our results add fresh evidence to the
literature, indicating the need to consider the geography of CSR in evaluating its value impact across corporations. The ﬁndings also
provide an opportunity for researchers to further study CSR and use location as a proxy, with little concern for the availability of historic
location data or changes. Our results add to the literature regarding charities and CSR by highlighting that the actions or presence of
charities are responsible for the link and not necessarily the charitability of the local population. We also highlight the need for further
study on the interaction between crime and CSR.
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Appendix A. Demographic variables deﬁnitions
Variable Deﬁnition
CSR_D10 Strength Proportion of ﬁrms within each ﬁrm's MSA with levels of industry-adjusted strength in the top decile nationwide. The proportion excludes
current ﬁrm's level of strength.
CSR_D10 Concern Proportion of ﬁrms within the MSA with levels of industry adjusted concern in the top decile nationwide. The proportion excludes current
ﬁrm's level of concern.
Group CSRit
Strength
Average level of strength present per MSA, excluding ﬁrm i.
Group CSRit
Concern
Average level of concern present per MSA, excluding ﬁrm i.
Deviation Strength Difference between ﬁrm i's level of strength and the Group Strength of ﬁrm i.
Deviation Concern Difference between ﬁrm i's level of concern and the Group Concern of ﬁrm i.
(continued on next page)
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(continued )
Variable Deﬁnition
Education Percentage of population over 25 with a bachelor's degree or more per MSA. Obtained from the U.S census Bureau for the year 2000.
Wealth Per Capita personal income at the MSA level. Obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Sophistication Per Capital investment income at the MSA level. Obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Protestant Percentage of people who belong to Protestant based on the question: “Do you belong to a religious denomination? If yes, which one?”
Obtained from the World Values Survey. Average per U.S Census region over Survey, conducted on 1990 1995, and 2000.
Trust Interpersonal trust is deﬁned as the percentage of respondents who answered “yes” to the question: “Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” Obtained from the World Values Survey. Average per
U.S Census region over Survey conducted on 1990 1995, and 2000.
# Charities The number of non-proﬁt organizations registered with the IRS by county aggregated to MSA level that ﬁled Form 990 within 24 months of
the BMF database date selected, from IRS Business Master Files (1995–2009). Obtained from the National Center for Charitable statistics.
Continued
Appendix A (Continued)
Variable Deﬁnition
Revenue per Charity The total charitable revenue within an MSA to number of nonproﬁt organizations registered with the IRS by county aggregated to MSA level
that ﬁled Form 990 within 24 months of the BMF database date selected, from IRS Business Master Files (1995–2009). Obtained from the
National Center for Charitable statistics.
Giving Charitable giving to adjusted gross income by county as reported on IRS tax return Form 1040, Schedule A, by households that itemize
deductions, from IRS Tax Return Summary Files (1997–2008). Obtained from the National Center for Charitable statistics.
Tax Burden The ratio of the estimated burden of major taxes for a hypothetical family of three earning $25,000 to the estimated burden of major taxes for
a hypothetical family of three earning $75,000. Obtained from the annual Tax Rates and Tax Burdens report prepared by the Ofﬁce of the
Chief Financial Ofﬁcer for the District of Columbia for the years 1997 through 2009.
Fraud Number of Fraud related prosecutions to total prosecutions ﬁled for all U.S Federal Judicial district courts within a state. Obtained from
Bureau of Justice statistics.
Regulatory Number of Regulatory related prosecutions to total prosecutions ﬁled for all U.S Federal Judicial district courts within a state. Obtained from
Bureau of Justice statistics.
Tax Number of Tax related prosecutions to total prosecutions ﬁled for all U.S Federal Judicial district courts within a state. Obtained from Bureau
of Justice statistics.
Environmental Number of Environment related prosecutions to total prosecutions ﬁled for all U.S Federal Judicial district courts within a state. Obtained
from Bureau of Justice statistics.
This table reports the deﬁnitions and sources of the main demographic and geographic variables employed in the study, for the pooled sample spanning calendar years
1991 through 2009.
Panel A presents the descriptive statistics of the Strength and Concern scores for each of the twelvemetropolitan statistical areas with
at least ten resident ﬁrms per year for at least ten years. The scores presented are transformed from binary points used by KLD and
instead represent a percentage of possible points obtained. The statistics are calculated on the pooled sample, spanning calendar years
1991 through 2009. Panel B reports the joint signiﬁcance tests for both strength and concern across a number of tests. Speciﬁcally,
Anova tests for equality of means across all metropolitan statistical areas, by strength and concern. Levene tests for homogeneity of
variances within each metropolitan statistical area across all the metropolitan statistical areas. Brown Forsyth modiﬁes the Levene test
by substituting mediums and ten percent trims. The statistics reported are the joint F-tests, with critical p values in parentheses.
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